

MEMOIRS
OF
GENERAL DUMOURIER.

WRITTEN BY HIMSELF.

.... VITAM QUI IMPENDERE VERO.

TRANSLATED BY JOHN FENWICK.

PART I.

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CONTENTS OF THE FIRST PART.

CHAP. I.		
<i>Of the General State of Affairs in France.</i>	1	
CHAP. II.		
<i>Of the State of the Armies</i> — —	10	
CHAP. III.		
<i>General Dumourier departs from Leige to Paris</i>	20	
CHAP. IV.		
<i>General Dumourier's abode at Paris</i> —	29	
CHAP. V.		
<i>Trial of the King</i> — — —	36	
CHAP. VI.		
<i>Frutliefs attempts of General Dumourier in behalf of the King</i>	42	
CHAP. VII.		
<i>Death of the King</i>	50	
CHAP. VIII.		
<i>General Dumourier's conferences with Cambon</i>	55	
CHAP. IX.		
<i>Interview of General Dumourier with some Jacobins</i>	63	
CHAP. X.		
<i>Of the Executive Council of France</i>	68	
CHAP. XI.		
<i>Retreat of Rolland from Administration</i> —	83	
CHAP. XII.		
<i>Negotiations with Holland and England</i>	85	
CHAP. XIII.		
<i>Departure of De Maulde, of Maret, and of General Dumourier from Paris.</i> —	100	
CHAP. XIV.		
<i>Fruitless Negotiations. Declaration of War</i>	104	

CONTENTS OF FIRST PART

1	Introduction
10	Chapter I. The History of the
20	Chapter II. The History of the
30	Chapter III. The History of the
40	Chapter IV. The History of the
50	Chapter V. The History of the
60	Chapter VI. The History of the
70	Chapter VII. The History of the
80	Chapter VIII. The History of the
90	Chapter IX. The History of the
100	Chapter X. The History of the
110	Chapter XI. The History of the
120	Chapter XII. The History of the
130	Chapter XIII. The History of the
140	Chapter XIV. The History of the
150	Chapter XV. The History of the
160	Chapter XVI. The History of the
170	Chapter XVII. The History of the
180	Chapter XVIII. The History of the
190	Chapter XIX. The History of the
200	Chapter XX. The History of the
210	Chapter XXI. The History of the
220	Chapter XXII. The History of the
230	Chapter XXIII. The History of the
240	Chapter XXIV. The History of the
250	Chapter XXV. The History of the
260	Chapter XXVI. The History of the
270	Chapter XXVII. The History of the
280	Chapter XXVIII. The History of the
290	Chapter XXIX. The History of the
300	Chapter XXX. The History of the
310	Chapter XXXI. The History of the
320	Chapter XXXII. The History of the
330	Chapter XXXIII. The History of the
340	Chapter XXXIV. The History of the
350	Chapter XXXV. The History of the
360	Chapter XXXVI. The History of the
370	Chapter XXXVII. The History of the
380	Chapter XXXVIII. The History of the
390	Chapter XXXIX. The History of the
400	Chapter XL. The History of the
410	Chapter XLI. The History of the
420	Chapter XLII. The History of the
430	Chapter XLIII. The History of the
440	Chapter XLIV. The History of the
450	Chapter XLV. The History of the
460	Chapter XLVI. The History of the
470	Chapter XLVII. The History of the
480	Chapter XLVIII. The History of the
490	Chapter XLIX. The History of the
500	Chapter L. The History of the
510	Chapter LI. The History of the
520	Chapter LII. The History of the
530	Chapter LIII. The History of the
540	Chapter LIV. The History of the
550	Chapter LV. The History of the
560	Chapter LVI. The History of the
570	Chapter LVII. The History of the
580	Chapter LVIII. The History of the
590	Chapter LIX. The History of the
600	Chapter LX. The History of the
610	Chapter LXI. The History of the
620	Chapter LXII. The History of the
630	Chapter LXIII. The History of the
640	Chapter LXIV. The History of the
650	Chapter LXV. The History of the
660	Chapter LXVI. The History of the
670	Chapter LXVII. The History of the
680	Chapter LXVIII. The History of the
690	Chapter LXIX. The History of the
700	Chapter LXX. The History of the
710	Chapter LXXI. The History of the
720	Chapter LXXII. The History of the
730	Chapter LXXIII. The History of the
740	Chapter LXXIV. The History of the
750	Chapter LXXV. The History of the
760	Chapter LXXVI. The History of the
770	Chapter LXXVII. The History of the
780	Chapter LXXVIII. The History of the
790	Chapter LXXIX. The History of the
800	Chapter LXXX. The History of the
810	Chapter LXXXI. The History of the
820	Chapter LXXXII. The History of the
830	Chapter LXXXIII. The History of the
840	Chapter LXXXIV. The History of the
850	Chapter LXXXV. The History of the
860	Chapter LXXXVI. The History of the
870	Chapter LXXXVII. The History of the
880	Chapter LXXXVIII. The History of the
890	Chapter LXXXIX. The History of the
900	Chapter LXXXX. The History of the
910	Chapter LXXXXI. The History of the
920	Chapter LXXXXII. The History of the
930	Chapter LXXXXIII. The History of the
940	Chapter LXXXXIV. The History of the
950	Chapter LXXXXV. The History of the
960	Chapter LXXXXVI. The History of the
970	Chapter LXXXXVII. The History of the
980	Chapter LXXXXVIII. The History of the
990	Chapter LXXXXIX. The History of the
1000	Chapter LXXXXX. The History of the

P R E F A C E.

IT is among the misfortunes that attend General Dumourier, to be abandoned by the world; to be the outcast of society; to be compelled to fly from city to city to seek an asylum from the rage and madness of his countrymen who imagine they will serve the public cause and rid the world of a traitor if they can but plunge a dagger into his breast; and to avoid the wretch whose avarice would tempt him to gain the price offered for his blood by the Convention. Compelled to live among strangers under the disguise of an assumed name, and to submit to the pain of listening to opinions on his conduct, equally severe and unjust, that are industriously circulated by the hired journalists of the different courts of Europe, who bestow their praises only on the successful, and every where encountering emigrants who detest him with as little reason, and as much ferocity as the Jacobins, this man, whom Ministers and Courts received with flattering caresses when he quitted the army, but afterward calumniated and persecuted, for having published memorials which contained his real and serious opinions, at length obeys the call of duty, by giving to the world the Memoirs of his life.

The

The most extravagant and contradictory tales respecting him have filled the journals of Europe, and portraits have been drawn of him so unlike each other, that not only his character, but his existence is become an enigma.

The Courier of Europe represents him with the force of Hercules, the licentiousness of Mark Anthony, the treachery of Hannibal, the cruelty of Sylla, and the military and political talents of Cæsar; they have also attributed to him, the possession of immense riches in the English funds. On the contrary, the Journal of the Lower Rhine describes him as possessing talents, but being deficient in judgment. This opinion, Dumourier regards as true praise, for he was never desirous of being thought subtle or practised in the art of changing his opinions according to his interests. He has always had fixed principles and a determined character. His mind was formed by the study of Plutarch; and he has mixed too little with men, to be known by any but a select few. Excepting during his travels and his wars, he has lived surrounded only by his books, and his chosen friends, of whom the greater part no longer exist. Far from esteeming the maxim of the Epicureans, which recommends the concealment of our actions, his whole life shall be exposed to the observation and judgment of his contemporaries. He has nothing to lose by this conduct; already he is poor, calumniated, proscribed, all that mankind regard as miserable; but he has every thing to gain,

gain, since men of elevated and upright minds, who read these Memoirs, will become his friends. With such men only he desires to live, and to whatever nation they belong, he shall always regard them as his fellow citizens.

The celebrated Dictator Fabius Maximus, he who alone could check the victories of Hannibal, and whom Dumourier earnestly endeavoured to imitate in his campaign against the king of Prussia, made this observation to Paulus Emilius, when he went with Varro, to command the army, "*Let him not fear who thirsts for glory; for, although we often find that true merit is eclipsed for a time, we have never known it to be entirely lost; it bursts at last through the clouds which encircle it, and appears arrayed in its bright and genuine colours.*"

Dumourier thought like Fabius, but their situations were widely different. Fabius resided on his estate with his family, exposed indeed to the calumnies of a faction, but honoured in the Senate, and by all the sages of Rome. They still regarded his counsels and preserved him in the command of the army, nor had ingratitude effaced the many services he had hitherto rendered his country, or destroyed the expectation of his still rendering them many more. Fabius was thus enabled to follow the bent of his mild and moderate disposition; and wait, in tranquillity, the progress of truth and justice. Such are not the happy circumstances of Dumourier; and however short a time he may have to live, it will be too long if it be stained

stained with the injustice of the public opinion. Not only therefore for himself, his contemporaries, and his country to whom he may one day be useful, but in justice to his friends, his relations, his advocates, he is obliged to repel the calumnies which follow him, and to dissipate the cloud which obscures the truth. This he will do by an honest and accurate detail of such facts as are important, and of which he was a competent witness.

For these reasons he is obliged to change the order of his Memoirs, and to submit to the public opinion the third volume, which contains the circumstances of the year 1793. These are the more important as they will enable the reader to foresee the issue of the strange events that have lately happened in Europe, in studying the nature of their motives and causes. If General Dumourier have stated any of them erroneously, his contemporaries are competent to detest his injustice, but he has surely this great reason for speaking the truth, that he may not increase the number of his enemies. He describes the French as they really are, and not such as Europe has hitherto regarded them, who seem to believe that the whole French nation are without religion, without honour, or humanity. The French are engaged in a bad cause. We are compelled to regard them with horror; but prudence will not permit us to despise them. They have displayed a magnificent courage; and, had they followed the opinion of virtuous and experienced men,

men, this period of their history would have been as honorable as it is now disgraceful and wretched,

Unhappily, their licentious excesses have destroyed the liberties of Europe. The example of their misfortunes, have induced every people to believe that they had better wear their chains in peace than fall into an anarchy that can never end but in absolute despotism.

There are two questions that naturally present themselves to which Dumourier's justification ought to reply, by stating the motives of his conduct, which appears to be in contradiction with his declared opinions.

It is asked, why did Dumourier, after the arrest of Louis on the 10th of August, refuse to obey the orders that he had received from another general, to make the soldiers renew their oath of fidelity to the king?

Dumourier had then under his command 10,000 men in the camp of Maulde near Tournay, and the Austrians who had a much larger army, were indefatigable in harassing his troops. Dillon had been sent to remove the general from his command. The ministers were then evidently inimicable to the revolution; and, as we shall see in the second volume of these Memoirs, pursued a conduct that was the cause of the king's misfortunes. The circumstances of the frightful scene of the 10th of August, were not accurately known in the camp. To engage the troops to renew their oath, according to the orders of General Dillon, was to prejudice

prejudge the cause of the people, to unfold the standard of rebellion against the nation, and to engage the army in a dispute respecting parties, at the very moment when we had a foreign enemy to combat; and the inevitable consequence would have been to have exposed the unfortunate Louis to the daggers and vengeance of the populous.

Again it is demanded, *how can Dumourier justify his conduct at the time when a Convention was appointed for the purpose of abolishing the monarchy and establishing a republic, in acknowledging the authority of this Convention, giving his sanction to the destruction of the monarchy, and to the assumed power of the republic.*

It was shortly after the general's refusal to give the oath to the troops in the camp of Maulde, that Fayette deserted from his army, and Dumourier was ordered to take the command in his stead. The king of Prussia entered Champagne with a formidable body of troops; and terror and treason ensured his success. Longwi and Verdun were taken. Dumourier, being in force in his camp at Grandpre, assembled his army at St. Manehould. The history of France does not present so dangerous a crisis. The 20th of September, the day on which the Convention declared France to be a republic, Dumourier and Kellerman repulsed the Prussians, who had attacked them at Valary. The two armies were in sight of each other and every day threatened to come to an engagement; and this surely was not the moment to enter
into

into quarrels respecting the form of government! The enemy were to be driven from the territories of France. The country was to be saved. Besides, the people were incensed against the king, whom they regarded as a traitor. At such a period to have maintained his prerogative, would have been the signal for his massacre. The people would have looked upon such an attempt as an act of treachery, which would have deprived Dumourier of the confidence of his countrymen, and thereby have left France an easy prey to the enemy.

As soon as the Prussians had retreated, Dumourier began the campaign in the Low Countries, and it was not till he had gained the Belgians for allies, and had acquired influence by his success, that he had any reason to hope that he could give peace to his country, deliver the imprisoned king, and establish on secure foundations the constitution of 1789. After that period, circumstances arose so extremely contrary to all possible expectation, Dumourier's journey to Paris, and the horrible murder of Louis XVI. so clearly convinced Dumourier of the guilty aims of the Convention and the implacability and power of the Jacobins, that the general resolved at all hazards to separate the cause of the country from that of the monsters by whom it was governed. His plan was bold. No other person in France had means in his power, for that purpose, so apparently well founded. But every circumstance turned
against

against him, and, above all, the inconstancy of his army.

The apparent contradiction between Dumourier's political principles and his military conduct have drawn upon him the unjust reproaches of many of the Emigrants, and of several persons of good sense, who could only judge from their mistaken view of the facts. As minister of foreign affairs, Dumourier certainly has shewn a sincere attachment to the Constitution; of this his dispatches, his discourses to the Assembly, are an abundant proof. He has equally opposed Republicans and Royalists. He procured the dismissal of three ministers of the former party, without leaguering himself with the court faction, and in consequence he was exposed to the fury of the Jacobins, who loudly demanded his being sent to the prison of Orleans. The public opinion of Dumourier's principles at that period, was so decided, that the following couplet was placed at the bottom of his portrait.

Inflexible soutien du trône, et de la loi,
Il fut ami du peuple, il fut ami du Roi*.

Afterward appointed to the command of the army, he had neither time nor inclination to concern himself in the intrigues and crimes of Paris. He was solely employed in repelling the enemy.

* Inflexible supporter of the throne and of the law, he was at once the friend of the people and of the king.

He

He is reproached, however, with never having changed his party, till he was no longer victorious, but the reproach is unjust; for, in the first place, he never changed his party, since, although he quitted the Republicans, with whom he had been long disgusted, yet he did not join the Royalists; and, that no doubt might remain respecting his opinion, he instantly proclaimed his desire of re-establishing the constitution of 1789. Secondly, his sentiments were constantly in opposition to those of the Convention, the Jacobins, and the Minister of War, during the time of his expedition into Belgia, from the month of November, as may be seen in his correspondence with Pache, published in January 1793. In this same month of January, he sent to the Convention four memorials, against the tyrannical decree of the 15th of December, and he neither presented himself to the Convention, nor the society of Jacobins; on the contrary, he gave in his resignation at that period. Thirdly, compelled for his personal safety to return to the army, he persevered in opposing the tyranny and injustice of the Convention. It was on the 12th of March that he wrote the well-known letter to the Convention, which was considered by the Jacobins as so great a crime. Hence, before he went to engage the Prince of Cobourg, and to decide the fate of France and her enemies on the plains of Nerwinde, his quarrel with the Convention was open and proclaimed. He was proscribed. He was, therefore,

therefore, compelled to overthrow the Convention, or perish.

The reproach that General Dumourier never quitted the Republican party till he was vanquished, was expressed with the greatest bitterness, in a letter written by the Elector of Cologne, to the General, which was published with a cruel ostentation which that prince might have foreborne against a man, then unfortunate and a fugitive. But surely it is to be supposed, that this prince will regret the injustice done to General Dumourier, when, by the reading of these Memoirs, he shall be convinced that it is an injustice. None of the wrongs the General has endured, has afflicted him so much as this, since the author of it is held in such just estimation throughout Europe.

Every nation in Europe must be convinced, that its most important interest are involved in the catastrophe of the French Revolution. If the belligerent powers should re-establish the monarchy, the vengeance of the nobles, and consequent proscriptions will fall on the greater part of the people. But, as the people are fortunately the most numerous body, as they have enjoyed the blessings of Liberty, and felt the advantage of holding the sovereign power in their hands, the triumph of the nobility and clergy, will be but momentary; it will endure no longer than while the foreign troops are enabled to support them. Every day will be productive of fresh rebellions, and another Revolution

volution still more destructive and terrible than the present, will restore the people to the exercise of the sovereignty. But if, by the imbecillity of the allied powers, the National Convention and the Jacobins are enabled to maintain the republic, then will their system of fraternization be exercised with irresistible force; and finally, not only the neighbouring nations, but the most distant countries will imitate the rebellion of France, and all Europe be reduced to a state of anarchy, while by a grand and rapid Revolution, the existing governments of the world will be hastened to destruction. There is a just medium, however, which the sensible part of the French nation eagerly desire to be adopted, and which would assure general tranquillity to Europe: it is that France should become a limited monarchy.

It is to this end the sovereigns of Europe ought to direct their efforts; and it is by so doing only they can secure the safety of the monarch who shall mount the throne of France. It is the only bond of universal peace.

If it be true that the ancient monarchy cannot be restored in France, it is no less certain that the species of Democracy, which exists there at present, cannot be of long duration.

Abstract notions have been too much consulted in this important matter, which may easily be reduced to a few simple truths. There is no political constitution which will not render a people happy, if it be the choice of the people, and if the government be enabled to act
without

without any other restraint than that of the law. The monarchical form of government is exclusively suited to large and populous nations, because such only are enabled to provide for the expence of monarchy. The republican form is better suited to small and poor countries, because it is administered with less expence. In the former, there is a unity of power, which constitutes the perfection of government; and it also includes secrecy and promptitude, without which great and complicated affairs cannot be successfully conducted. Aristocracy is necessary in a Republic; drawing together the authorities that otherwise would be without union, and excluding the tyranny that results from the arbitrary will of a people governing themselves. Pure democracy will always produce an inconsistent and ineffectual government, because it neither admits of union of opinions, nor of prudence, promptitude, nor secrecy; and it includes in itself principles that beget disorders among the people, and are entirely subversive of their happiness.

All the Republics that we are acquainted with, ancient or modern, have been meliorated by Aristocracy. We must not even except Athens, which was devoid of success and splendor, excepting when its councils were directed by Aristides, Themistocles, Cymon, and Pericles; and was reduced to slavery, at first by Sparta, and afterward by Philip of Macedon, when the democracy triumphed, and when celebrated

celebrated men were no longer at the head of its affairs.

The civilization of our manners, the extent of our commerce, our wealth our luxuries, in a word, all the enjoyments on which are founded the splendor and happiness of our age, are opposed to the establishment of a Republic. If we will have a perfect equality among men for the basis of our political union, we must go back to the simplicity of the first ages, cast away our advantages, and return to a state of nature. A government founded on equality can be nothing more than the contract of a savage people, who, for the first time, have assembled in society.

The French have erred strangely in this respect. They compare themselves to the first Romans; but Brutus, in freeing Rome from the Tarquins who were detestable tyrants, in abolishing royalty, was better informed of the interests of men, than to establish equality and democracy. He preserved the royal authority while he divided it between two Consuls, to whom he left the Lictors, the Fasces, and the Ax, as well as all the real attributes of royalty. He new modelled the sovereign power, by ordaining that the hands which held it should be changed every year. Yet the Consuls were taken from the senate, that is to say, from the Aristocracy. Afterward, indeed, new changes took place in the government, when bold plebeians attacked the privileges of the senate by their decemvirs and tribunes. But the govern-
C ment

ment remained five hundred years an aristocracy; and, when people had made innovations, if the senate had not conceived the sublime policy of rendering the Roman people a nation of conquerors, its government would have resembled that which we have since seen in the Republic of Florence: Always feeble, always agitated by civil wars, and open to the invasion of every ambitious neighbour, Rome would have been conquered, or would have become a dower, or a heritage like Florence; and scarcely would history have spoken of that city, which her aristocracy rendered the most celebrated of the whole world.

But even this species of republic which Brutus founded, and which may be considered as a mixed government, extending only over a small territory, it would have been impossible to have re-established, after the death of Cæsar, or Tiberius, or Nero. The circumstances of the Roman Empire, at that period, would have destroyed the Republican spirit in its birth. The bounds of the empire were too much enlarged; the Romans were too rich; luxury, arts, and all the enjoyments that spring from them, had spread their influence too much to accord with the austerity of a Republic. And liberty does not necessarily demand a Republican government. England is a proof, that a people may be free under a monarch. Liberty consists in being free from obedience to all laws but those that the people themselves have made. The law is the sanctuary in which the sovereignty

reignty resides ; and Kings, or other magistrates to whom the executive power is delegated, being subject to the law, the people are as free as they can be consistently with their happiness. Such are the bounds of a true liberty, and all beyond is anarchy.

Nothing can be better proved than that a republic cannot now be established, without the destruction of those very advantages which distinguish the age. We cannot obtain that object, without confounding property, and forcing the minds of men to submission by terror and crimes. To be a republic, we must first be in a state of anarchy ; but does anarchy conduct to equality and liberty ? No. It overthrows all established order ; and, in the place of hereditary authority, substitutes that of the populace, which being directed by less reasonable principles, necessarily exercises an insupportable tyranny : Of which France is an example. The palaces and rich property of the nobility and clergy cannot be equally divided, and they become the prey of those miscreants that are the most depraved and daring, and perhaps, one day we may see the Ex-capuchin Chabot, Lord of Chantilly ; Bazire, Lord of Chambord, and Merlin, Lord of Chanteloup ; and filling the places of the great Condé, the Marechal de Saxe, and the Duke de Choiseuil. Perhaps we shall see changes a thousand times more extravagant and ridiculous. And what good will result to the people by these hideous changes ?

They will still have masters, But of what a new and contemptible race !

This disastrous state of things is at present confined to France, but its democratic or rather monstrous republic cannot exist but by the spreading of anarchy among all its neighbours. Thus her interest, and every part of her policy, (which she is not even desirous of concealing) consists in preaching and propagating anarchy. As experience proves that it is easy to deceive and betray a people in preaching liberty to them, (since it is less difficult to create confusion than to restore order,) and as the poor are more numerous in every country than the rich and the noble, it is to be feared that, tempted by the example and support of the licentious people of France, all nations will imitate her excesses, and turbulence and anarchy become universal.

This confusion, accompanied with all its miseries, is inevitable, if the foreign powers are unable to stop the progress of the French Revolution. The forces employed by the allies are so great that success is infallible if they be directed by wisdom and prudence. But if the allies abuse their power and rob the unfortunate family, whose defenders they avow themselves to be, the excess of the French people will be justified, and the same dangers and misfortunes will again desolate Europe.

General Dumourier has discussed this subject more fully in another work, which he has delivered to persons who have promised to convey it

it to the Emperor, and he hopes for the sake of mankind, that it will not be neglected or forgotten.

Although General Dumourier has asserted the necessity of founding every stable government on an aristocracy, it is not to be understood that he would grant all right and privilege to the nobles, and nothing to the people. Nobility was in its origin the reward of virtue; and the titles, honours, and feudal rights attached to it, are the legitimate property of their descendants, and nothing could be more unjust than to deprive such of the nobility as have not borne arms against France of any part of their hereditary rights. But nobles should have no privileges in the eye of the law, either in engrossing of places, or in exemption from duties. In a free government, all are equal in this respect, and a nobleman is a simple citizen. He has no just claim to the acquisition of places but by his services, his talents, and his virtues. He has the advantages of education, leisure, and the example of his ancestry. Of these it is his duty to avail himself; but those are his only just advantages; and in this system is to be found the only true equality that has existed in any age, or among any people.

It is not because all the members of the Convention, and the generals of the armies of France have been raised from among the vulgar, that the decrees of the former, or the military conduct of the latter, excite the disdain and the

the indignation of Europe, but because they are absurd, criminal, ignorant, and cruel.

Certainly a state may exist without a king, a court, or a nobility; but it is not true that, great and powerful nation can exist without nobility; for nobility being the reward of virtue, becomes a motive not easily to be destroyed in the descendants of the virtuous man.

This applies only to nobility, as it existed in its origin, for that which is sold by kings is a wretched abuse, the offspring of the avarice of kings, and will cease of itself as a ridiculous vanity, when titles shall no longer be attended with penuniary privileges, which the public opinion has forever abolished in France, and which if an attempt be made to restore it by foreign powers will but serve to produce another Revolution.

The aristocracy that General Dumourier regards as necessary to all government is that of virtue and talent. To govern men, to sit in judgment upon crimes, or to decide on questions of property, to instruct men in the duties of religion, to conduct the citizens of a great empire in war, are employments that must be studied as other employments are. The declaration of the Rights of Man, and the Constitution to which it served as a basis, will instruct the future king of the French, in what manner it is his duty to select those who are to aid him in the government of the kingdom. The right of choosing such men is the noblest attribute of royalty. Let us examine that sublime Constitution

stitution, and we shall find that no condition can be found more happy for a wise and virtuous man than that of a king of France.

Frenchmen, listen to the temperate and informed part of Europe, again adopt with sincerity, that true code of philosophy, and your monarch will be respected and powerful, your nobility will again become worthy of their ancestors, your clergy pious, worthy and useful, and you will be the happiest nation of the earth!

Such is the zealous wish of a man whom you would destroy, because he saved your country, and has always spoken with sincerity; whom the emigrants load with calumnies, because in quitting his country he would not turn his arms against her like themselves; whom the ministers of foreign courts declared to be a dangerous man because he asserts that the sovereign power resides in the people. No sufferings will induce him to change either his opinions or his conduct, or his wishes for your happiness, since reason and not the chances of fortune ought to conduct the wise man.

And you also, sovereigns of Europe, be persuaded that the persecuted man whom you seem to condemn, to whom you refuse the asylum which he ought to find among you, although he brings no other title than a pure and honest mind, be persuaded that he is influenced by the love of mankind, which inspires him with respect for all just authority, that he is actuated
with

with the desire of seeing peace restored to all nations, that he abhors war, and renounces it for himself, even in the service of his country, excepting when he believes it to be necessary to arrest the course of ambition and injustice.



A BRIEF

A
BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE
LIFE OF
GENERAL DUMOURIER.

EXTRACTED FROM A LETTER WRITTEN TO
A FRIEND.

—AT present, my dear friend, let us quit these abstract notions, too sublime to be the general subject of a letter, and let us enquire what is the result of such principles. It is that we ought to do all the good we can in our stations; to be humane; but, above all, to be just. It is never our duty to enquire what the opinions of men respecting us will be, and our actions ought never to be influenced by an attention to the question of what may be thought of them. It is in times of great public commotion, during the revolutions of empires, that this principle ought to be maintained with greatest firmness. It is then that the just man will call forth his talents to save his country, exert his genius to represent the dangers of excess, and his courage to stand between the nation and a great crime.

He will be hated and persecuted by all parties, since he will not flatter the passions of faction; but he consoles himself in recollecting that he performs
his

his duty. Persecutions appear but an incident that he was to expect; and he supports them with fortitude, because he knows they are the effect of mistake that cannot be lasting.

History restores the virtuous man to his just rank among his fellow citizens. My enemies cannot deny that I have acquired great military fame; but, to obscure it, they paint me as a faithless, immoral, unprincipled man. They would drive me from the theatre of Europe to make room for meaner actors. I am willing to remain a spectator of the scene, but I cannot consent to descend from the stage with opprobrium. These considerations have driven me to two decisive measures. The first, to publish the facts that justify the latter period of my public life, which has been the most calumniated. The second, to deliver myself up into the hands of the emperor, who, instigated and deceived by the gross calumnies of my persecutors, has given orders to have me arrested. Prudence perhaps would dictate a different conduct on my part, but duty rests on other calculations. These are mine: that this voluntary surrender of myself into his power ought to convince the emperor of my innocence, and incline him to lay aside his prejudices. He is represented as a just man; I believe him to be such. He will value the confidence I place in his character, he will produce the accusations they have urged against me, and I shall prove their falsehood. These memoirs will have appeared, in the interval, to justify me to the world; and, having gained the confidence of a monarch even more than any other interested in the re-establishment of peace and order, I may again render services to humanity and my unhappy country. Should the emperor refuse to hear my justification, and consign me to the oblivion of a prison, I shall only have to suffer and to die. But this History of my life will vindicate

vindicate my name. The consequences of the treachery and injustice of my persecutors will fall on themselves; and the emperor himself will regret me.

In the approaching month, I shall be fifty-five years of age. Shall I really suffer less if, by shamefully concealing myself, I can escape a few days of reproach or imprisonment?

I will now give you a short History of my life, which may serve as a supplement to my memoirs, if I am not allowed time to finish them. I was born at Cambray in 1739 of parents not affluent although noble. My Father was a man of great virtue and understanding; he bestowed on me a very careful and extensive education; at 18 years of age I became a soldier; and at two and twenty I was honoured with the cross of St. Louis and had received twenty-two wounds.

On peace being made in 1763, I began my travels, to study the languages and manners of different nations. The Emigrants have said that at this time I was employed as a spy by the French ministry. It is not improbable that the *petitt-maitres* of Tarentum and Athens (if there were any such men there) have said as much of Pythagoras and of Plato.

In 1768, I was put upon the staff belonging to the army in Corsica; and, having served with reputation in the two campaigns of 1768 and 1769, I was raised to the rank Colonel.

In 1770, the Duke de Choiseuil appointed me minister to the confederates of Poland; and I commanded a body of men in that country during two campaigns, and conducted several very important negotiations with various success. As the measures of the confederates were ill concerted, their revolution was unfortunate, and ended in the partition of Poland.

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In 1772, the Marquis of Monteynard, minister of war, employed me in correcting and revising the military code of laws; at the end of the same year, this minister by the express order of Louis the XV. entrusted me with the management of a secret negotiation relative to the revolution in Sweden; but, having received my instructions on this affair immediately from the king himself and unknown to the Duke D'Aiguillon minister of foreign affairs; I was arrested at Hamburg in 1773, and conducted to the Bastile by the orders of that minister. The irresolute Louis XV. yielding to the importunities of Madame du Barry his mistress, and the Duke Aiguillon, disgraced the virtuous Monteynard, forebore to inform the Duke of the authority he had given me to negotiate, and suffered me to bear the weight of a criminal prosecution, which the Duke D'Aiguillon, suspecting the truth, feared to carry to all its extremity. I rejected offers of friendship and protection made me by this despotic minister whom I did not esteem; and after lying six months in the Bastile I was banished to the castle of Caen for three months.

Louis XV. died soon after; and D'Aiguillon was disgraced. I had no inclination to take advantage of the expiration of the *Lettre de Cachet*, for the purpose of regaining my liberty; I was anxious to be completely justified, and therefore petitioned Louis XVI. to remove me to the Bastile and to order a revision of my trial. The king would not permit me to remain in prison, and commanded M. du Muy, M. de Vergennes, and M. de Sartine to revise the trial, and those three ministers signed a declaration that I had been unjustly prosecuted. Immediately afterward I was sent to Lisle, in my rank of colonel, to make a report respecting the new military manoeuvres which the Baron de Pirsch had brought from Prussia. I had also a commission to examine a plan for improving the navigation of the river Lys, and another plan
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of forming a harbour in the channel at Ambleteuse. And these employments occupied the latter end of the year 1774, and the whole of 1775.

In 1776, I was joined in a commission with the Chevalier D'Oisy, captain of a man of war, and Colonel la Rozière, one of the ablest engineers in Europe, to determine on a proper place in the channel for the construction of a naval port. I passed the year 1777, in the country twenty leagues from Paris. It is the only period of repose in my life. At the end of that year, I was invited to Paris, by M. de Montbarey, minister of war, on account of the rupture between England and her colonies, which I had long predicted.

In 1778, I procured the office of commandant of Cherbourg to be revived and given to me. Being persuaded that Cherbourg was better calculated than any other place in the channel for a national harbour, and being aided by the zeal, activity, and influence of the Duke d'Harcourt, governor of the province, I obtained a decision, in favour of Cherbourg, of a question that had been agitated during an hundred years, concerning the preference to be given to Cherbourg or La Hogue, for the site of a naval port. From that time till 1789, I was occupied in superintending the works of Cherbourg; and, during that period, I was but three times at Paris. When I first arrived at Cherbourg, it contained no more than seven thousand three hundred inhabitants, and when I quitted that place it contained nearly twenty thousand inhabitants.

The emigrants, not contented with saying I was a spy from the ministry while I was on my travels, have also reported that I was employed by the war-office as one of the tools of its secret intrigues, although the time that I have passed in Paris, in the different journeys I made to that place during twelve years,

years, did not altogether amount to six months, and although in these journies I very rarely visited Versailles.

Let us review this history: twenty two wounds received in battle, six campaigns made in Germany, two in Corfica, and two in Poland, important trusts discharged, a city raised from obscurity to a flourishing condition, a naval port established, fortified, and rendered fit for the purposes of the navy, twenty years spent in travels, that had a knowledge of mankind for their object, and in fine the study of languages, of the military art, and of the policy of nations; such are the events of which it is composed. It will be happy for France if she produce many such designing and selfish men. If those who were called by their birth, their wealth, and their dignities to maintain the honour, and produce the happiness of their country, had qualified themselves with equal care, France would either have needed no revolution, or the revolution would have been more happy and honourable.

For my part, the revolution was not necessary to raise me to dignities. I should soon have been lieutenant-general in the ordinary course of promotion, and was on the point of receiving honours that men at that period sought after. I possessed an income of 20,000 livres, which was equal to my wants and desires. Yet I could not but see that France was disgraced abroad, and ruined within. I foresaw that she hastened to this latter period of her misery; and have often warned those of the ministers, whom I esteemed to be honest men, of the event.

When the revolution commenced, I deprived its character of much of its evil in the place where I commanded. At Cherbourg, the excesses of the populace were punished by me with death; but the people could not accuse me of being inimicable to their

their liberty. Those who were placed in like situations would have rendered an inestimable service to their country, in exerting the same firmness with the same discernment.

The military governments of towns in France being suppressed, I went to Paris, where, during two years, I studied the influence and character of the revolution. The flight of the princes of France was an irreparable injury done to the cause of the king. I foresaw that the exercise of the *Veto* would not produce the end that was proposed by it, and would occasion the ruin of the monarch's cause, and I opposed it by all the means that were in my power.

In 1791, I was appointed to the command of the country from Nantes to Bourdeaux. At that period a religious war raged in La Vendée, and the people laid waste the castles and lands of the nobility. I had the good fortune to calm the minds of the people, and to preserve tranquillity in that country till the month of February 1792, when I was recalled to Paris, was raised to the rank of lieutenant-general, and appointed minister of foreign affairs.

I am reproached with having caused the war by my counsels; but I shall prove that the war was already inevitable, when I began my administration, and that indeed it might be said to have commenced. I acknowledge, however, that my opinion was decidedly for the declaration of war, as was also that of the king, who, not only approved of my memorial to the National Assembly on that subject, (which was three days in his hands) but made corrections in it, and himself composed the discourse he delivered to the assembly on that occasion.

At the end of three months, finding myself embarrassed by the various factions, and being sincerely desirous to see the king's council possessing proper dignity, and his measures governed by constitutional principles,

principles, I changed the ministry, and obtained a promise that the king would sanction two decrees which appeared expedient to his service. Having done so, I would have retired from the administration. The king would not grant me his permission; the ministry was again changed by his order, and I took the war department. But, soon perceiving that the court had deceived me, I resolved not to be the instrument of their intrigues. I predicted to the unhappy king and queen all the misfortunes in which they were involving themselves, and I gave in my resignation three days after being appointed minister of war.

I was not driven from the councils of the king as the emigrants have asserted, but resigned in opposition to the entreaties of Louis. He was two days before he would accept of my resignation, and he did not suffer me to depart without expressing the deepest regret.

After that period, I commanded the armies with the greatest success. If the French had displayed as much moderation and virtue as they have enjoyed of success, peace had been long since restored to Europe; Louis would have been on his throne; and the nation would not have been, as now, stained with crimes, and the slave of anarchy. France would have been happy and illustrious under her constitution and her king.

I have now, my worthy friend, given you a short history of my life, and it will stand in the place of one more circumstantial, if opportunity be not given me to prepare a fuller account for the public. My heart is unburthened in sending you this letter. Here, I wait the orders of the emperor, and the decision of my fate, without inquietude. My mind, far from being weakened is fortified by disasters; and I shall be always myself.



M E M O I R S
O F
G E N E R A L D U M O U R I E R.

FOR THE YEAR 1793.

B O O K I.

C H A P. I.

Of the general State of Affairs in France.

IN the preceding part of these Memoirs we have seen the French combating for their independence with courage. But there was too much violence in their mode of acquiring liberty to afford any hope that they should enjoy either that or their subsequent successes with moderation. Having been hitherto victorious, they had no doubt that they were now invincible. They no longer thought of maintaining the good-will of a people who had received them with open arms. They beheld nothing but conquests before them; and, while they tyrannized over the minds of their newly adopted brethren by turbulent clubs, they

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robbed them of their property and left them without any species of liberty either moral or physical.

Every person of character and political experience had retired from the management of affairs, to escape the persecutions of an *Ochlocracy* that governed under the sanction of the dreadful society of Jacobins. The King was in prison. The worthy of every description were persecuted under the names of Feuillans, Moderes, and Intriguers. The constitution was destroyed. Paris was in the hands of the federates, invited there by the Girondine party, but who, on their arrival at Paris, had been gained by the Jacobins. These federates now threatened to bring to the scaffold Pethion, Brissot, and all the leaders of the Girondine party. But their threats were loudest against General Dumourier, whom Marat, Rober, spierre, and the other heads of the Jacobins pointed out as the instrument and protector of that party, then distinguished by the name of *the politicians**. This was a prejudice against the general altogether unfounded; for he was unconnected with either party, having no more esteem for one than the other, but regarding them as equally adverse to the tranquillity of France, which he saw no means of establishing but by a revolution capable of destroying the influence of both. To this end his army was his only engine; and it will soon be seen how little that was to be relied on.

France at the period of which we are now speaking, assumed an appearance of prosperity that deceived and elated the people; and more especially, the predominant party. But she had rendered herself odious to foreign nations; and was, in

* The word in the original is *Politiques*. At Paris, the Girondists were called *Les Politiques* or *Les Hommes d'Etat*. But these epithets were used in disdain, because the politics of Statesmen were deemed to be unworthy of the simplicity of freemen.



truth, divided and weakened within herself. On the side of Italy, the French empire was extended among the Alps by the acquisition of Savoy ; and was further aggrandized by the addition of the county of Nice. These territories had incorporated themselves with the republic, but violence alone was the author of the union.

Clubs, composed of a few corrupt men, who could exist only by a change in the government, were established in every city by the Jacobin soldiers that were scattered throughout the different armies. Their violent resolutions at once acquired the validity of law. Questions were not even put to the vote. Every thing was carried by menaces and force. And patriotic addresses arrived at Paris from the foot of the Alps, from the mountains of the principality of Basle, from Mayence, Liege, and the cities of Belgium. The national convention believed, or affected to believe, that the blessings of our condition were ascertained by foreigners ranging themselves under our colours.

Geneva became a club instead of a republic. Claviere gave a loose to old resentments that he harboured against his country ; and being appointed minister of finances by the Girondine party, he sacrificed General Montesquiou, who, in discharge of his duty as general of the army in the neighbourhood of Geneva, had attempted to save that city and Switzerland from the baneful influence of the Jacobins.

The principality of Porentruy, deceived by Gobel bishop of Paris and by his nephew Ringler, two despicable adventurers, had also incorporated itself with France and had adopted its dangerous reveries.

Custine was master of Worms, Spire, and Mayence ; but he had neglected to enter Coblenz, and had evacuated Franckfort, after having ex-

cited the detestation of the inhabitants against the avarice and turbulence of a people in whose hands the torch of philosophy had lighted up the flames of discord.

Between Custine's army and that commanded by Dumourier in the Netherlands, another had been placed under the orders of General Bournonville. But this army had been nearly annihilated in a disgraceful expedition undertaken by its general against Treves, after he had lost the opportunity of attacking that city with advantage. One third of his army being thus destroyed, the remainder had retired for the purposes of recruiting into cantonments in Lorraine. The Prussians and Austrians took possession of the interval left open by this retreat; and their position, connected with Coblenz, Treves, and Luxumbourg, entirely cut off the communication between Custine and Dumourier; so that there was no longer any concert in the efforts of the two armies. And indeed Dumourier's plans had already been deranged by the stupid pride of Custine, by the ignorance of the convention, and by the treachery of Pache, Meunier, and Hassenfratz, who having the direction of the war department and resolving to ruin Dumourier, had disorganized the armies and withheld their means of subsistence. The Netherlands were in the hands of the French army called the army of Belgium; composed of that of Dumourier and the army of the Ardennes commanded by General Valence. The latter was not more than 15,000 strong. The two armies occupied Aix-la-chapelle and the banks of the Meuse. Clubs agitated all the cities of Belgium. The convention had sent commissioners to execute the odious decree of the 15th of December, that sequestered the public property of Belgium; and so had frustrated the

the hopes of uniting those rich provinces to the French republic, although that union was the very object of this oppressive decree. But the convention were eager to seize on the wealth of Belgium previous to any union. Such was the plan of the financier Cambon; and he boasted of the project.

The immoral and ferocious dispositions of the six commissioners employed in this affair were well calculated to ruin the scheme. Danton was a man of great energy of character; but was without education and equally detestable in mind as he was coarse and disgusting in appearance. La Croix was an adventurer, a debauchee, and a braggart; and was destitute of all sense of honour. Camus, the most rugged, haughty awkward and pedantic of the Jansenists. Trielhard, little differing from Camus. Merlin of Douay, a well-meaning man; but splenetic, and infected with extravagant and theoretic notions. And Gossuin, a monster of a brutal and fordid spirit*.

To these commissioners were joined thirty-two others named by the executive council, but re-

* These portraits seem to be drawn with too much severity. If much may be said against these deputies, it is also well known that they have rendered many services to their country. We should have been unwilling to have published these and other personalities that are to be found in General Dumourier's Memoirs, if we had had any right to suppress them, and if we were not moreover persuaded that the important facts, extensive views, and useful objects of the work would amply compensate for some intemperate passages. Besides, when we recollect the ingratitude and gross calumnies that have pursued General Dumourier (who probably has discovered more talent and conduct than any other person in the revolution, and who certainly, as a general, has gained the most important victories and acquired the greatest glory) we cannot wonder that in writing of his bitterest enemies, he has indulged himself in writing satire instead of history. *Note by the Editor.*

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commended by the club of Jacobins at Paris. The greater part of these assistants were miscreants who came only to massacre and pillage throughout the rich provinces of Belgium. They over-ran the unfortunate country; and while, by the terror of sabres and fuses, they drove the inhabitants to demand their being incorporated with the French republic, these men plundered the churches and palaces, emptied the coffers and sold the furniture of all who fell under their displeasure, and whom they marked by the odious epithet of *Aristocats*; and whom often consisting of fathers of families and old men, and women and children, they sent as hostages into the fortified towns of France.

The north and west of France began to unfold the seeds of discontent against this bloody and horrible anarchy. The revolvers of La Vendée were not however dangerous as yet; and there had been no difficulty in crushing them utterly, if any foresight had existed in the National Convention, or in the councils of the executive power. But what is to be expected from a government in which while the wise hesitated, mad men step in and decide.

Two factions equally atrocious, the Mountain, and the Girondine party, divided the Convention.

The former, made up of the most furious Jacobins, neither palliated their wicked principles nor their crimes. They spoke of nothing but blood and death. And, being without capacity to govern, having neither knowledge nor digested plan, they would suffer no dominion whatever. Not even the principal men of the faction could boast of ruling it; and the liberty of the faction consisted in anarchy.

The other faction, composed of metaphysicians and intriguing statesmen, had long abused the superiority acquired by their talents, and their
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more cultivated education. They had treated the Jacobins with disdain. The executive council was their instrument. And they imagined they securely held the reins of Government. But the Convention had been disgusted by their insolence and pride; and it was known, that this faction were the enemies of royalty, only because they aspired to fill its place. Hence the independent part of the assembly, those men who execrated the atrocities of the Jacobins, stood yet more in fear of the ambition of Condorcet, Brissot, Pethion, Gensonné, Guadet, Vergniaux, &c. And thus all other parties became united to humble the presumptuous Girondists.

The measure of bringing the unhappy king to trial, resulted from the hatred of the two factions. It served them mutually for food; but the Girondists have too late discovered how fatal it has been to them. Louis, the victim of their ambition and of their cowardice dragged them down in his fall, and left the field open to the triumph of the Jacobins.

The factions that split the assembly, divided the departments also; each espousing the passions of their deputies. Bourdeaux, Marseilles, and Lyons, hated the Mountain; and were the first to begin an opposition, that has since degenerated into a civil war.

The Pyrenees and the inclemency of the seasons, still secured the frontier provinces of Spain; and that kingdom, at its leisure, collected the forces that were afterwards directed against Roussillon; while the Convention, occupied entirely by their own quarrels, and by the state of Paris, provided none of the means of repelling the attack.

Paris the most miserable and most guilty city that has existed, thought herself the rival of Rome, because in the space of a few months, she had become

become the scene of crimes, massacres, and catastrophes, that were the accumulation of ages in the capital of the Roman empire. Forty theatres, always crouded, amused her trifling, cowardly, and cruel inhabitants; while a small band of villains, no less ridiculous in their pretensions, than barbarous in their deeds, supported by two or three thousand dependants, the outcasts of the provinces, and many of whom, indeed, were not Frenchmen, destroyed the memory of the massacres and horrors of each evening by those of the succeeding morning. The frightful cavern of the Jacobins vomited forth every ill, and spread terror thro' every house. All men of property trembled, and citizens, who, in peaceful times would have been mild and virtuous, hardened their hearts against pity, and were ready to applaud guilt, lest they should become its victims. All who had the remains of virtue or of shame were fled or were driven from the administration of the department, of the municipality, and of the sections. An infallible sign always precedes the fall of nations. Then good men hide themselves; and the wicked and violent alone remain in the conduct of affairs. And in this crisis, it is not even in the power of supernatural aid to save the people from the effects of public phrenzy.

Such was the terrible situation of France in the beginning of the year 1793. Such is the gulph to which democracy leads, when the populace takes the place of the nation, and tyrannises over it by the Oligarchy of a few depraved wretches selected from the refuse of the people. At Rome a senate, during many ages, controlled popular vehemence; and directed it, not toward happiness, but to the aggrandisement of the nation; for

for Rome turned her arms abroad, that she might not destroy her own offspring. France has no such counterpoise as that of the senate of Rome; and the want of virtue in the governing party can bring nothing but disgrace and misfortune on her head.

C H A P. II.

Of the State of the Armies.

ALTHOUGH the political condition of France had even possessed more solidity, and had been regulated by a prudent assembly, although France had gained the hearts of the nations to which her arms had opened her the way instead of having disgusted them by a tyranny more offensive than that of formal despotism, it had been impossible that this new Republic should support herself against the interests of the whole of Europe, unless she had established a military system capable of making head against a universal attack upon her territory by sea and land. The National Convention, never mistrusting themselves on any subject, because they were ignorant of the political combinations of things, issued a decree on the 19th of November, 1792, against every despot in the universe, and invited the people every where, to throw off their yoke ; promising them protection and fraternity on condition of their adopting the French System. But they ought to have humbled the empire, Prussia, Spain, and Russia, before they made so proud a declaration. A just assembly, an assembly regarding the rights of man united in society, (for man in a savage state has no rights, and a state of nature confounds all rights) would have perceived such a decree to have been unjust. The maxim of *compelling men to come in* is not more philosophical in a social view, than it is in theology. The Jacobin preacher is not less unjust, than the preacher of the church of Rome ; and it is unbecoming of liberty to be propagated, like the alcoran, by the sword.

But in taking the violent step of the 19th of November, it will at least be supposed, that the Convention,

Convention, desiring to range all men on the side of liberty, had taken due precautions that the decree should be something more than a vain and dangerous boast, and consequently that they had placed their military establishment on the strongest footing. General Dumourier, on becoming minister of the war department (which situation he held but three days, being appointed on the 13th and quitting it on the 16th of June, 1792) read a bold memorial to the National Assembly, proving clearly, that they thought not of the army, and that far from placing it in a state to support the war, they were trifling with the public liberty and safety. This memorial was forgotten. The campaign was begun. The General's success which ought to have gained him the confidence of his fellow citizens, if no further yet as far as respected the military department, served merely to throw suspicion on every advice he could give them. They not only altered his plan of the campaign, but they were desirous of retarding his too rapid progress. The Girondine party frankly told him, they should be extremely sorry to see him force the enemy too promptly to demand peace, since they feared the consequence of the return of the army before they should have finished the constitution.

The Jacobins, who supposed the General to be connected with the Girondine party, accused him of ambition. Their contemptible journals, especially that of Marat, affected to make him, at one time dictator, at another Duke of Brabant, and at another, head of the Orleans faction, and under this last fiction; described him as intending to place the eldest son of the infamous and odious Philip, on the throne. Nothing could be more contradictory than these calumnies; for if Dumourier desired to
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be dictator, he surely was not the agent of the house of Orleans; if his aim was to be Duke of Brabant, he had then an interest foreign to the party intrigues of his country. But the absurdest accusations were sufficient in France to tarnish innocence. It has however seen that calumny was too feeble to stop the progress of a victorious general; and machinations of a more affective nature were employed, and which ended in the destruction of the military resources.

Servan, having discovered the difficulties of the war department, feigned sickness; and while he declared the insufficiency of his strength for the fatigues of his situation, he appointed himself general of the army of the Pyrenees. Servan was lieutenant colonel in the preceding month of May. His health, unequal to the duties of the cabinet, was robust enough to support the fatigues of the field. Yet the Revolution, it seems, was undertaken to reform the improper distribution and abuse of employments!

Roland, minister of the interior department, was the most intriguing and least capable of the Girondine part. He had a friend, named Pache; a man of talent and great zeal, who had formerly been secretary to the Marechal de Castries and had educated his son. Roland imagined he could make himself master of the war department, in procuring it for Pache. We shall afterward see how far the result was favourable to the designs of Roland.

Pache, now become minister of war, chose the following men, or was obliged to appoint them, to fill the principal departments of his office, Meusnier an academician and a man of sense but of as depraved a mind as could be found in France; another academician, named Vandermonde; a Jacobin

cobin who had rendered himself ridiculous by the affected vulgarity of his manners, and dangerous by his intrigues, and who had assumed the name of Hassenfratz to conceal the name of le Lievre, under which he would have been recognized to his disgrace; and Audouin who was Vicar of St. Eustache and son-in-law of Pache.

These new ministers threw every thing into confusion in the different departments of the war office, during the most important and hazardous campaign. The few persons of experience that remained were discharged and their situations filled, not merely by Jacobins, but by such of them as had distinguished themselves in the massacres of the first six days of September. The administrations established for the supply of arms, cloathing, provisions, and for regulating the hospitals, were abolished. The old and experienced commissaries and contractors were either dismissed, or calumniated, or dragged to the bar of justice, or thrown into prison, and rendered infamous without being heard. As these imprudent and unjust measures equally affected all the armies, although particularly aimed at that of Dumourier, the complaints of the generals were universal. Commissioners from the Convention were sent to examine into the truth of the complaints. Their reports were alarming. But the committee of military affairs, who in no case could have any other effect than to embarrass the measures of the war department however wisely concerted, was now made the instrument of justifying the false statements of Pache in direct opposition to those of the generals and commissioners. The Convention passed to the order of the day; and Pache escaped with having been simply ordered to the bar, and with the reproaches which the generals continued to lay upon him.

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The commissioners Camus, Gossuin, Danton, and la Croix, were themselves witnesses in the month of December, of the distressed condition of the army in the camp of Liege; and rendered an account of it in their reports to the Conventions, but without applying any effective remedy to the evil. The army was composed of forty-eight battalions; the completest of which were from three hundred and fifty, to four hundred men, and many of them were not more than two hundred: the whole amounting to between fourteen and fifteen thousand foot. The cavalry were about three thousand two hundred. Most of the soldiers were without shoes, and encamped in the mud, their feet being protected by nothing but hay twisted together. The rest of their clothing corresponded with this deplorable appearance. Clothes had been distributed to some, but those, to the number of fifteen hundred, deserted and returned to their respective homes. The sick filled the hospitals, where they were in want of every thing. To such a state was the victorious army of Jemappe reduced after the conquest of Belgia.

This army had been obliged to stop short on the banks of the Meuse for want of provisions; and, if its distress had been known to general Clairfait, he might have engaged it with great advantage, for the carriages of the artillery were almost entirely destroyed, and in the preceding month of December six thousand artillery horses had died at Tongres and at Liege for want of forage. The foot had but ten thousand fusées in a condition for service. The cavalry were in want of boots, saddles, cloaks, carbines, pistols, and sabres. The army was without money; and often the staff officers raised contributions among themselves to make

make out the soldier's subsistence-money for the day.

General Dumourier could have supplied all these wants in Brabant, Liege, and Holland; and had even entered into the necessary contracts and made reports respecting them; but every plan was rejected and all his arrangements destroyed. The commissary Ronfin, of whom we have spoken in the preceding volume, had orders to condemn, embarrass and retard every measure. His hostility was open; he paid no regard to the opinion of the general: for he was certain of the support of the military committee, of the financier Gambon, of Pache and his dependants, together with the secret protection of the commissioners of the Convention, who appeared to blame these disorders, but suffered them to remain without a check, and in the account they rendered in the month of January excused Ronfin although they acknowledged him to be unfit for his situation.

Manufactures were established at Paris for every thing wanted in the armies. Cloth was conveyed from Liege to Paris to make clothing for the troops. Leather was bought at Liege, at Dinans, and all along the banks of the Meuse, to make shoes at Paris, which were sent to the army at nine livres each pair, altho' at Liege shoes cost no more than four livres, or four livres ten sous per pair. Cloaks that could be manufactured at Antwerp for nineteen or twenty-one livres each, cost fifty livres each at Paris; and cloaks were sent from Paris to the army. The corn of the Netherlands was sent to Nantz, from Nantz to Paris, was ground in the mills of Mont Martre, near Paris, and sent back to the Netherlands.

The greatest evil that resulted from these disorders, was their influence on the conduct of the soldiery.

foldiery. We have already taken a review of the character of these troops, and have seen how difficult it is was for General Dumourier to avail himself of their courage. It may even be said, that he had accomplished what seemed to be impossible; and that in beating the Prussians and Austrians, he had obtained a victory more tedious and difficult over his licentious soldiers, having introduced discipline and love of order into an army, one fourth part of which was composed of troops of the line, infected by the spirit of the times, and the other three parts of volunteers, each having an opinion of his own, and each proud of his victories, and rendered susceptible of more mischief than good, by his notions of equality.

In the beginning of the campaign of 1792, the battalions were in want of officers. The superior officers were ill chosen, and were without influence. The soldiers themselves, chose their captains, lieutenants, and subaltern officers, and hence these officers were subject to the caprice of men, who acknowledged no superior. A single Jacobin was sufficient to ruin a battalion by his licentious discourses; and it was only by culpable condescensions that an officer could preserve his rank, or obtain promotion.

The city of Liege was the tomb of Frenchmen. They died there of hunger and every species of distress. And this city, where the army knew nothing but wants, was more fatal to it than Capua, with its enjoyments, had been to the Carthaginians.

The people of Liege had carried the Revolutionary spirit to an excess, proportioned to the excess of their sufferings when they were betrayed and subdued by the Prussians. They had

had therefore withdrawn their confidence from the leaders of the Revolution, who laboured to secure liberty on the foundations of wise principles. Fabry and Chestrel, who were very honest men, and wished only for the welfare of their country had entirely lost their influence. The populace of Outremeuse, perhaps the most dangerous in Europe after those of London and Paris, had made themselves masters, not of the government for there was none, but of the public force. Those unhappy men thought only of vengeance, and punishment. They conducted the French soldiers into the houses of their particular enemies, whom they treated as Aristocrats; that is to say, they pillaged and murdered them. This cruel intestine war, in which each French soldier took an active part either for or against his host, destroyed the little discipline and good conduct which had hitherto existed in the French army in the midst of misery, want, and complicated distresses. But it was impossible to punish, for it was impossible to discover the guilty. The people of Leige cast the fault upon the French; and the French recriminated upon the people of Leige. The General would have established the punishment of death for such crimes. It had even been demanded of him by his army in a moment of enthusiasm. But the Commissioners, while they seemed to approve of this severity, secretly and effectually opposed it. Since that time, we have seen that one of the causes of the execution of the unfortunate Custine, was the having established the punishment of death in his army.

Dumourier's army occupied cantonments from Aix-la-Chapelle to Leige, in which cities were all the officers who could not procure quarters with their battalions. So that the soldiers were almost left without commanders. Want had carried

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marauding

marauding to its utmost pitch. The soldiers robbed in bands from village to village; and the peasants took their revenge in killing such as, at any time, they found single.

General Dumourier, prevented by these circumstances from pushing on to Cologne, and forcing Clairfait to repass the Rhine, resolved at least to secure the Meuse. He therefore ordered the army of the Ardennes, consisting of 15000 men, and commanded by General Valence, to join him; and placed them on his right, in the countries of Stavelo, Malmedy, Spa, Verviers, and Huy. A body of 18000 men, under the command of General d'Harville, occupied the Meuse from Givet to Namur; having his out-posts at Ciney, Marche, and Rochefort. The army under General Miranda occupied the left from Tongres to Ruremonde. It consisted of 18000 men. New battalions, lately arrived from France, formed the garrison of the Netherlands. And this line along the Meuse amounted from 65,000 to 70,000 men; and would have been sufficient to have seized upon the country between the Meuse and the Rhine, and to have occupied the banks of that last river from Burick to Cologne, if it had been possible, first, to take Maestricht, which General Dumourier was not permitted to do, although he had proposed it in the beginning of December, and had it then in his power; secondly, to place a garrison in Juliers, which was also forbidden him because it was deemed necessary to keep terms with the Elector Palatine, lest he should deliver the passage of Manheim to the Imperial army, by which means they would have cut off the army of Custine from Alsace; and, lastly, if the army of Belgia had been provided with provisions, arms, cloathing and money, so that it might have marched in the month of
December,

December, and have forced the Imperialists to repass the Rhine.

General Dumourier was persuaded of the impossibility of his preserving his position on the Meuse, while he should neither be in possession of Guelders, Venloo, Maestricht, nor Juliers. He wrote to the Convention and the Minister of the War Department to that effect. The reasons of his opinion will be found in his correspondence with Pache, printed in January 1793. It was toward the close of the preceding November that his quarrel commenced with that Minister, with the Jacobins who supported him, and with the Convention, who had not discernment to foresee the effects of his criminal conduct. In December began the trial of the unfortunate Monarch, whose mild character conducted him to the scaffold. From that instant, the general foresaw the crimes and misfortunes that have since sprung from the chaos in France. He attempted to sound the dispositions of his army respecting the King, but his Staff-officers whom he employed in the task effected nothing, and thenceforward the general was proscribed. Not one soldier, not one officer would consider the case of the king. Every one discovered the same apathy; and this cold disposition in the army on that point, hastened the General's design of visiting Paris.

C H A P. III.

General Dumourier departs from Leige for Paris.

GENERAL Dumourier was thus a prey to various chagrins in the palace of the Prince Bishop of Leige; and, if it can be a consolation to that Prelate, he may read with pleasure that after the most splendid victories, this general was more unfortunate than himself. He had been harassed by the calumnies of the Jacobins from the moment that he had saved France by driving a formidable foe out of her territory. The conquest of Belgium had encreased the *column of his enemies*, to express himself in the words he used to the National Convention after the battle of Jemappe. He almost reproached himself with having lost the opportunity of quitting the command that was offered him on his return from Champagne, by the ingratitude of his fellow citizens. He had caused the war to be declared, in his former situation as minister of foreign affairs; he had afterward conducted it with glory as a general; he had nothing wherewith to reproach himself on these accounts; but he saw the successes of the war mouldering away, and he could not but be penetrated with grief, since the important share he had taken in the public concerns during nine months, had identified his fate with that of his country.

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All his letters and memorials were either rejected or misinterpreted ; and his counsels slighted. Cambon declared, nothing could be more dangerous to a Republic than a victorious general. It was laid down as an axiom in the tribune of the National Convention, that ingratitude was a necessary virtue in Republicans. The Convention withheld the recompences due to the heroes of Champagne and Belgium, because the General had demanded them. By a decree, they authorized the minister of war to annul the nomination of officers made by the Generals. The corps were left destitute of officers. New and ignorant men came from France, to gather the fruits of the army's toils. The General complained of these things to the National Convention ; and declared, if they would not do him right respecting them, both as to the wants of his army and the other evils which were the cause of its destruction and disorganization, he should be compelled to give in his resignation.

He demanded as an indispensable step, the revocation of the impolitic and unjust decree of the 15th of December, that had driven the Belgians to despair. Notwithstanding the remonstrances of the General, it had been resolved in the Convention that the decree should take place on the first of January. Cambon had obtained this decision ; the four Commissioners Camus, Gossuin, Danton, and La Croix, supported him ; and the two latter boasted that they had done so, to avenge themselves for an insult they had received at Ath, where they had been refused a lodging. The General's honour was concerned in preventing the execution of the tyrannical decree, because when he entered the Netherlands on the third of November he had published, with
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the sanction of the National Convention, a proclamation declaring to the Belgians, that the French entered their country as friends and brethren; that they came to give them entire liberty; and that the people should be left to chuse their own constitution and mode of government, without interference from the French. The decree not only destroyed the force of this proclamation, but also robbed the unhappy Belgians of all remains of liberty. The Commissioners sequestered the public property and that of the clergy; and this nation no longer possessed any public revenue, nor the authorities necessary to preserve even the form of government.

Cambon expected to find money for the expences of the war, in this plunder of a country that was the friend of France, and that had not been conquered, but had voluntarily associated itself with the Republic. This criminal and sordid conduct produced no benefit to France; on the contrary, it deprived her of 40,000 men, that the Belgians were willing to furnish, and fifty millions of livres that they would have poured into the French treasury, to contribute to the defence of their liberty; and it was followed by the loss of those fine Provinces, and excited a detestation of the National Convention and their Commissioners, that will be eternal.

By an article of the decree the generals were charged with its execution, and were required to place the seals on the public property. General Dumourier rejected this dishonourable employment; and the commissioners gave the charge to Ronfin, who employed as his instruments, soldiers and clerks of office, all Jacobins, who stole half the

the wealth they were ordered to secure in the name of the nation.

The general, being unable to prevent these base actions, resolved, at least, to mark his disapprobation of them as much as he could, to the Belgians, by being absent, if that were possible, while they should be transacting. On these, and all the other subjects of his vexation, he explained his views so clearly to the commissioners, and General Valence supported his reasonings with such force, that in a conference held at Liege between the commissioners, the generals, and the administrators that were entrusted with providing subsistence for the army, it being clearly shewn to these administrators that they could not furnish him provisions even to remain at Liege, much less to march forward, it was decided that Camus, the President of the commission, should return to Paris, attended by General Thouvenot, the first to make a suitable report to the National Convention, and the second to lay before the military committee an account of the wants of the army, and to obtain the necessary arrangements, and also solid and ample contracts for establishing magazines on the Meuse, and more than all the rest, to obtain a revocation of the decree of the 15th of December, which added the whole Belgic nation to the number of our enemies. General Thouvenot took with him also written observations of generals on the plan of the campaign, as laid down by the minister of war, and was to bring back with him a decision on that point. The journey, however, was altogether unsuccessful, notwithstanding the talents of General Thouvenot, because Camus, opinionated, deceitful and vulgar, could not be contented without

without engrossing all the honour of the embassy, assumed the sole right of speaking, supported the decree, and yielded to the will of others respecting the article of the committee of contracts. Thus, instead of removing the evils complained of, he only encreased the difficulty of the general's situation.

Meanwhile General Dumourier shut himself up in the palace of Liege, and was employed in soliciting leave to return to Paris, and in reflecting on his misery. He continued to declare in his letters and memorials that it was impossible for him any longer to hold the command if the Convention did not abolish the committee of contracts, which was no better than a den of knaves, and had cancelled his bargains of every kind with the Belgians; and if they did not change the minister for the war department, who had nearly ruined the armies, and if they should continue to treat as conquered countries the provinces that should be allied to France.

Such were the ostensible motives on which the general demanded leave to go to Paris. He had another, however, much more essential; but which he concealed with the utmost care. It was to endeavour to save the unfortunate Louis the 16th, by representing to the governing party the danger to which the nation was exposed without; and the necessity of forming a solid plan for the campaign, which it would be necessary to commence at a very early period. He hoped the weight of this consideration, aided by other motives, he meant to urge on the different factions in the Convention,

vention, would procure a suspension of the abominable trial.

General Dumourier was in this embarrassed situation at Liege, and his mind agitated in the manner we have seen, at the very moment when the Jacobins were contriving to bring him to trial; and when they pretended that he passed his time surrounded by courtezans and actresses. The ministry indeed had sent him a detachment from the opera; but these returned to Paris after a stay of no more than twenty-four hours. This expedition, and that of a troop of comedians from the theatre of Montanier, cost the nation more than an 100,000 livres, the government pretending to inculcate French revolutionary principles to the Belgians, by exhibiting democratic pieces on their theatres. The general disdained to be the protector of such follies. All that he saw of these deputies from the opera was at his table, having invited them to dinner. And certainly they conducted themselves with much decency and good sense; and discovered much more sagacity than the ministers that had sent them.

The general found it extremely difficult to obtain his leave of absence. Pache and the Jacobins feared his presence at Paris. And, having in vain urged the state of his health and his need of repose, he was at length compelled to engage the commissioners to demand the leave of absence directly in their own name, and to declare solemnly his determination to resign in case of refusal.

In the midst of the vices that infected the army, there remained a sentiment of justice among the soldiers which secured their attachment to a general with whom they had always been

been victorious, and to whom they could no way attribute their present distress. The commissioners therefore declared in their letters that the army would certainly disband themselves should the general resign. The leave of absence arrived; and the General prepared instantly to depart, although La Croix proposed to make a tour with him to Aix-la-Chapelle, in the hope of detaining him still longer in that country. But Dumourier had secretly determined never more to resume the command; and was not willing, by visiting the quarters, to make a tacit engagement with the soldiers for his return.

He arrived at Brussels; the command of which he had given to General Moreton. This man, who died in good time at Douay, had played a very curious part at Paris in the revolution. He was an Aristocrat, taking that word in its most odious acceptance. He had been colonel of the regiment of La Fère, and had been broken under the old government for the vilest acts of military despotism. Resentment threw him into the hands of the Republican party; and his influence in the councils of the Palais Royal had made him one of the chief actors in the revolution. Become secretary of the Jacobins he plotted to procure a revision of his former sentence; but the sentence remained in its original state. He was afterward appointed colonel in the army of the north, and as he was well acquainted with all the parts of the discipline of the infantry, and had considerable ability, General Dumourier appointed him chief of the staff to the army of the North. When Dumourier took upon him the command in Champagne, Moreton,
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who could not penetrate the veil that covered that affair, although perfectly brave; misconducted himself at the breaking up of the camp of Maulde; and was in danger of being massacred by the people of Valenciennes. General Dumourier's return to the army of the north, then become the army of Belgium, replaced Moreton at the head of his staff. But as Thouvenot possessed qualities for the situation which Moreton wanted, Dumourier made the latter lieutenant-general by seniority (for six months was sufficient to advance men to the highest rank by seniority in this revolutionary army) and gave him the command at Brussels and in Brabant, in order to make General Thouvenot head of the staff. Moreton then threw off all restraint toward General Dumourier; and entirely gained by the Jacobins, to whom he already owed many obligations, he opposed the sentiments and judgment of his General in every possible way. He adopted the decree of the 15th of December; and became hateful to the people of Brabant. General Dumourier found him surrounded by the Jacobin populace. He had raised a corps that assumed the name of the Sans Culottes. These came to make an harangue to the general; and used the phrases *thou* and *citizen*. Dumourier was offended with this grossness; and plainly told them that, being chiefly French soldiers, they ought not to address him in such familiar phrases, because such expressed an equality inconsistent with the discipline of an army; that they ought to call him *General* or *Citizen-general*, but never *citizen*, without such like addition. He ordered their statutes to be brought to him, and told them, that on his return
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from Paris, he would decide respecting them: for this mob demanded pay; and were really paid, though unknown to the General, with the consent of the commissioners, as a recompense for their services, or rather for the atrocious vexations they had committed.

General Dumourier had, before this, sent a proclamation from Liege, to engage the Belgians speedily to hold their primary assemblies, and forthwith to chuse a constituent assembly; because, in the decree of the 15th of December it was said, that the sequestration of the public property should cease when the people of Belgia should have chosen their representatives. The commissioners saw clearly enough that the appointment of an assembly would restore the Belgians to their liberty, and would deprive the commissioners of the administration of the public revenue, and especially of the plundering of the churches. They therefore delayed the publishing of the general's proclamation; and afterward opposed its execution, and prevented the holding of the primary assemblies at Alost, the place Dumourier had appointed, with a view to counteract the influence of the populace of Brussels. The General had been warned by the example of Louis the XVI. who might have avoided the influence of Paris, by assembling the states-general at Tours, Orleans, Blois, or Bourges. But seeing, now, that the only means of snatching Belgium from the tyranny of the French convention had failed, he continued his journey without delay to Paris.

C H A P. IV.

General Dumourier's abode at Paris.

GENERAL Dumourier arrived in Paris on the first of January. Having reflected that, on his visit to that place after the expulsion of the Prussians from Champagne, Marat and the other Jacobin journalists had reproached him with shewing himself at the theatre, and with seeking popularity, he resolved to avoid all places of public resort, to live as privately as possible, and to see only his particular friends or such persons as might be useful to him in the objects of his journey.

He was five days without leaving his apartments, during which he composed four memorials: the first, on the necessity of recalling the decree of the 15th of December, which had been confirmed and even aggravated by two decrees passed on the 28th and 31st of the same month; the second, respecting the ill effects of the committee of contracts, and the necessity of replacing on the old footing the supplying of the army with provisions, forage, horses, clothing, &c. by the appointment of intelligent contractors; and the third, and fourth, on military affairs and the plans of the ensuing campaign.

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He concluded each of these memorials by a new declaration of his resolution to resign if the National Convention should neglect any of these objects. He accompanied them by a letter to the president, requesting him to engage the Convention to form a new committee for the purpose of treating with the Generals, both as to the wants of the armies and future military operations. On the 7th of January, he sent the memorials and his letter to the president, whose name was Treilhard, who had formerly been an advocate, and who shortly after this was joined with Merlin of Douay, another advocate, to the four former commissioners of Belgia. The president, neglecting to communicate the papers to the Convention, General Dumourier wrote him another letter, very short and peremptory.

On the 11th of January, a summary account of the affair was given to the Convention. The letter was read. The memorials were suppressed there, and sent to a committee of twenty-one members recently established under the name of the committee of general safety. The most popular members of all the other committees had been selected for this committee. They opened their sittings on the 13th, and the General was invited to assist. The memorials were read. Ignorant and frivolous disputes succeeded. All spoke together. And, after sitting three hours, they broke up without making the least progress. A further memorial, more detailed on certain points, was demanded of the General. As to the plan of the campaign, the members unanimously agreed utterly to decline the consideration of it, alledging that it belonged properly to the executive council. The General attended a second sitting of the committee, held

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on the evening of the 15th, with a memorial containing a minute statement of the required information. There were not more than half of the members present. They dropped in one after another; and, running slightly thro' the memorial, which was very long and intricate, no more was said of the matter.

General Valence arriving previous to this sitting, he was admitted, and read a memorial respecting the recruiting and new modelling of the army. He proposed that the infantry should be divided into brigades, by incorporating two battalions of the National guards with each battalion of the line. This project, adopted by the Convention in the midst of the ensuing campaign, completed the ruin of the French army, by rendering it a body of mere volunteers without restraint or discipline. The attention of the committee, whose trifling and inquisitive disposition was equalled only by their ignorance and indifference to the public welfare, was caught by this novelty, although it ought never to have been discussed but in a time of peace, or at least not till the conclusion of the campaign; and the committee entirely threw aside the important objects contained in the General's memoirs.

General Biron, having quitted the army of Alsace to take upon him the command of that in the country of Nice, assisted also at the third sitting; and read a very pressing memorial respecting the new contractors and the committee of contracts. The minister of war being ordered to attend, and not being able to answer to the accusations of the three Generals, was very grossly treated by the committee, charmed with finding an opportunity of humbling a minister. They had however a just occasion in the present instance, for the minister had no other defence to offer

offer than the presenting of statements taxed with being false. And the whole affair was referred to the military committee, the least respectable of all the committees of the Convention.

General Dumourier afterward attended a fourth sitting. There were but five members present. They discussed nothing. And, when they separated, they told him they would send for him when they should have occasion to consult him again. Immediately the General retired to a small country house at Clichy, from whence he came every day to Paris in the prosecution of his greatest object, that of saving the king. He was never again called to attend the committee of general safety. All the important affairs of France were suspended during that moment for the pursuit of a measure that involved the ruin of the nation. The Convention were occupied by nothing but the trial of the king; which was prosecuted with the greatest bitterness and most indecent barbarity.

It was from the fate of his memorials that General Dumourier expected the salvation or the ruin of his country. Had they been adopted, he designed to have presented himself to the Convention, to have appeared in public, and openly to have canvassed for the unfortunate monarch. He might then have promised himself an important influence. He would have been surrounded by a number of officers and soldiers of his army who were on leave of absence at Paris. And, by adding other means to these, he would have commanded a party sufficiently strong to counteract the Jacobins, and their support, the federates. This resource was lost; and, far from being able to save the king, General Dumourier, destitute of power and influence, and considered as a man dangerous to the republic, because he disapproved

disapproved of the crimes that were committing, feared only to injure Louis XVI. to precipitate the horrible catastrophe, which thenceforward appeared inevitable, and which has cost the General nothing but anguish.

A contemptible man, a man without knowledge and capacity, General La Bourdonnaye, the personal enemy of General Dumourier, in revenge for having lost the command of the army of the north in the preceding year, in consequence of complaints made against him by General Dumourier, published throughout Paris that the General had no other object in coming there than to save *the most honest man in the kingdom*. It was an appellation that indeed General Dumourier had very justly given to the king in a letter written in 1791; and which had been printed, with the other papers found in the iron chest, that Roland had lately delivered up to the Convention.

The same report was spread by the Jacobins, especially by Marat and his too active faction. It was said that the General held consultations with Roland and the Girondists every evening. And these last, offended that he was as unwilling to visit them in private, as the Jacobins spread the rumour that he secretly saw *Philip Egalité*: that man unworthy of bearing the name of Duke of Orleans.

Dumourier went each day to the council; and returned in the evening to Clichy. But he never dined with any of the Ministers, excepting Le Brun and Garat. He avowedly shunned the houses of Monge, minister of the marine; Roland, minister of the home-department; Claviere, minister of the finances; and above all, that of Pache, minister of the war department.

The war-office was become the filthiest place imaginable, where 400 clerks, and numbers of women, affected to carry slovenliness of dress and coarseness of manners into a system: Nothing was forwarded in the office, and nothing but rapacity was to be seen on all hands. Several of the villains employed in this department, having Hassenfratz and Meusnier at their head, worked day and night to collect false depositions, and to forge papers, to substantiate the accusation that Hassenfratz had made at the Jacobin society against the General, charging him with having embezzled twelve hundred thousand livres in his contracts in Belgium. They excited the hatred of the federates against the General; and often, in passing by groupes of these, he has heard them propose in a loud voice to place his head on the top of a pike. One day in particular, he thought himself happy in escaping through a narrow passage from a gang of those federates in the street of Montmartre, being warned against them by a tradesman who knew him, he having formerly lived two years in the same street. In the general meetings of the sections and in the coffee-houses, men were paid to declaim against him; and it was more than once in contemplation to seize upon his person.

The frightful Santerre, commander of the National guards of Paris, professed a great attachment to General Dumourier; and frequently pressed him to dine with his brother-in-law. His design was to entice him to dine with Marat. The General always declined the invitation; but on the politest pretences, obliged, in order to escape assassination, to behave with seeming respect to this execrable man.

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A circumstance that happened at this time, rendered the situation of the General more critical, although he had no concern in it. Colonel Westerman had caned Marat on the Pont-neuf, for having in his journal accused the Colonel of being the creature of General Dumourier, and the principal instrument of his robberies. Marat thirsted to avenge himself on the General whom he supposed to be the cause of the insult. Dumourier every day received intimations of Marat's designs against him, both from particular friends and by anonymous letters. And the General, for the first time in his life, adopted the precaution of carrying pistols in his pocket.

Du Bois de Crancé, the most cowardly and barbarous of the Jacobins, being one day at table with the General, shewed a disposition to offend him, imagining that the General would be terrified by his great bulk and the ferocity of his air. General Dumourier laid hold of him, and imposed silence upon him very effectually. Du Bois de Crancé, in revenge, repeated every day in the Convention that Dumourier despised its members, painting it as an assembly consisting of four hundred fools headed by three hundred robbers. Thus a violent storm gathered round the General; and his enemies waited only for his resignation to arrest and try him. He had long before been proscribed.

C H A P. V.

Trial of the King.

IT was in the same temper that this horde of cannibals pushed on the trial of the King with the bitterest fury and most horrible joy. The trial is in the hands of all the nations of Europe. The proofs, documents, and pleadings are published, and will remain the dishonour of the French nation to all posterity. Never was crime committed with such cowardness, such cold bloodedness, and such deliberation of mind. More than an hundred and fifty members of the pretended tribunal, had printed and published their opinion even before they had been made acquainted with the facts and papers, on which it ought to have been founded. They ought therefore to have abstained from giving their vote, or their vote ought to have been rejected; but the unfortunate Louis XVI. had none of the privileges of an accused man on his trial. It is astonishing that the three hundred and ten members, who had the courage to vote for preserving the king's life in spite of the daggers at their throats, had not resolutely insisted that each of the judges who had given his opinion publicly in writing, should be incapacitated from voting. But those friends of humanity will pardon this reflection in
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an historian who, far from designing to cast any reproach upon them, wishes to have the power of raising a column to their names, as deserving of remembrance, as were the names of the heroes of Marathon. In the unworthiest assembly in the world, were found three hundred and ten men who acted with conscience and courage in the midst of general depravity and cowardice, and to whom the royal family of France has an eternal obligation. Just and humane citizens, receive the homage of a soldier, who acknowledges more courage in your conduct than he has shewn, or than he has seen, in all his battles where he commanded with such success and glory!

This homage is pure and disinterested. He who pays it expects nothing from kings, and is the friend of liberty; and, having served his country honestly, has renounced her, whether she again be brought under the terrible yoke of despotism, or, by the ignorance and false policy of the combined powers, she shall remain a republic under the iron system of the Jacobins: For he no longer has any hope of seeing France governed by a constitutional king, subject to the law and the support of the law. Your virtue shall be more respected in after times, inasmuch as it shall appear in the same page with the conduct of the Girondists, whose intrigues, as far at least as they are known to General Dumourier, shall be delivered over, one by one, to history whose province it is to punish crimes.

It has often been demanded if it were the intention of the Girondine party to save the king. The question is difficult to answer; and it does not seem that we can discover the truth, but in distinguishing two periods of very different characters in the existence of this faction, and consequently designs

designs in its ambitious members, that varied with the change of circumstances.

It is certain that this faction, after having long swayed the Convention and the ministry, elated by the excess of their influence, openly aspired to the establishing of a Republic, as the means of perpetuating their power. They had subdued the *feuillans*, the moderate party, and the royalists. They had enlisted most of the daily journals on their side. The Paris Journal, the Chronicle, the Monitor, the Patriot, the Thermometor, the Journals of Gorsas and of Carra, in a word all that were esteemed, and in great circulation, were composed, corrected, and edited by the members of this faction. The best orators of the Convention, Guadet, Vergniaux, La Source, Brissot, Gensonné, and Condorcet, gave reputation and currency to the opinions of the faction. They had seized upon the direction of the principal committees. Sieyes and Condorcet were at the head of the committee of the constitution. Brissot and Gensonné, governed the diplomatic committee, associated with that of general safety. The committee of finances was entirely at the devotion of Cambon, whom the Girondine party at that time believed to be their partizan. And they ruled Paris during all the mayoralty of Pethion.

This faction may be called the Jesuits of the revolution. They acted on the same political system; they possessed at first the same unlimited power; blinded, afterward, in a like manner, by pride, they committed the same faults, and underwent the same fate. During their reign they contemned and insulted the royal family. Pethion, in the same carriage with the king and queen, on their return from Varennes, took every occasion to declare that he no longer designed to support the monarchy. The unfortunate queen related the
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fact to General Dumourier; and Pethion afterwards acknowledged it, on his naming it to him.

But in the month of November 1792, circumstances were entirely changed. The popularity of *King Pethion*, for so he was called in Paris, had sunk under the ascendancy of the Jacobins, and the Marseillois, whom the Jacobins had gained by patriotic orgies. A weak but honest man, named Chambon, had succeeded Pethion in the mayoralty. He was despised, and without power. The Jacobins tyrannized over the sections; and the commune of Paris assumed an authority, independent of the Convention and frequently superior to it.

Barbaroux, deputy from Marseilles, one of the Girondine party, relying on his influence in that city, undertook to bring a new body of men from Marseilles; and, mean while, the party employed Roland, the minister of the interior, to invite the departments to send Federates to relieve Paris and the Convention from the tyranny of the former body of Marseillois. Nothing could be more imprudent than this measure. It could not fail to produce a civil war, unless the new Federates, should strengthen them against their antagonists: gained like the former by the Jacobins, which happened in the sequel.

The intrigues of the Girondists were unmasked with great capacity, by Danton, La Croix, Roberespierre, and Marat. Impartial men in the Convention, saw the dangerous ambition of the Girondine faction. It was then that the party ought to have adopted a decisive conduct in defending the innocence of the king, and opposing the sentence of death; and then, had they fallen, they would, at least, have fallen with honour. But it is most probable that, on the contrary,

trary, their efforts would have been successful, that the departments would have joined them to save the king and the country, and that the Jacobins would have been crushed. But the Girondine party possessed not the courage their situation demanded. They contented themselves with proposing an inadequate appeal to the people on the fate of Louis XVI. And this was considered as holding out another signal of civil war.

The Girondists were terrified, and yielded to the torrent; but they did not save themselves by their cowardice in voting with the Jacobins against the unfortunate monarch, who thus fell the victim of the united villainy of implacable monsters, and ignorant intriguers. Pethion had the base cruelty, in a moment, while pity yet hesitated to condemn the king, to recall the remembrance of the violence that was ascribed to him on the unhappy days of the 9th and 10th of August. Having thus incensed his hearers by an unworthy charge, he concluded by voting for death. The veiled opinion of Condorcet, amounted to the same sentence. The conduct of this artful schoolman, abounding in subtlety, and destitute of feeling, has been equally atrocious in every stage of the Revolution.

Brissot, Guadet, Gensonné, and Vergniaux, were even eager to vote contrary to their known sentiments.

The accusation against Louis XVI. contained no article sufficiently weighty to sanction the judgment. The catastrophe of the 10th of August, was no crime to be imputed to the king. Carra had the impudence to publish in his journal, and declare in the Convention, that the event of that day had been prepared by a committee of five persons, among whom were Pethion, Robespierre, and he, Carra; that the committee met in a small public house in the Fauxbourg St. Antoine; that the

the scheme of obliging the king to arm and oppose the people, had failed twice, and had even been on the point of failing on the 10th of August. Hence it is clear, had this paper of Carra, been produced on the trial, it had justified the king, by proving the necessity of his taking up arms in his own defence. But neither justice, nor policy, nor good sense, were concerned in this daring trial.

Providence seems to have destined the arrival of this period, so disgraceful to France, and so decisive of her fate. All things conspired against the unfortunate and innocent victim. Even the Emigrants, in the zeal of a mistaken attachment, adopted measures that were fatal to him. Bertrand, ex-minister of the marine, a refugee in England, imagined he could save the king by sending to the Convention authentic papers, proving, that the leaders of both parties had negotiated with the king in secret. Danton and La Croix, especially, were so directly implicated in the papers, that their credit had been utterly ruined, if Danton, master of the *mountain*, that is to say the Jacobin party, and La Croix, who influenced the Plain, that is to say the independent part of the assembly, had not united their efforts to bury the memory of those papers with the ill-fated king. The zeal of Bertrand, instead of saving Louis, hastened his death. The murder was committed. On the guilty evening, all the theatres were full. Unhappy Frenchmen! When you shall read this chapter, bathed with the tears of him who offers the picture of the greatest of your crimes to your view, you shall tremble for yourselves, and you shall acknowledge the terrible vengeance that awaits you to be too just!

C H A P. VI.

Fruitless attempts of General Dumourier in behalf of the King.

AMONG the absurd and unjust accusations of the Emigrants against General Dumourier, that which has obtained most credit with ignorant and superficial men is, that he did not avail himself of the ascendancy which his victories gave him over his army, to lead it to Paris, and liberate the king. But it is to be considered, first, that his influence with his army was always very precarious, and events afterward proved that it was not to be relied on; secondly, that this army was more than a hundred leagues from Paris, was in want of every necessary for a march, not being able even to quit the country of Liege, without great hazard of losing its artillery for the want of horses; that this step would have abandoned that country to the Austrians, who also would have followed him; and that it would have been a degree of treachery to the honour and interests of the French nation, which would have cost the General and all his principal officers their heads before they could even have entered France; thirdly, that this army had for some time been in
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an absolute incapacity of proceeding even to the Rhine, which was only twenty leagues distant, and consequently could not accomplish the longer march to Paris.

General Dumourier, however, did entertain the project of conducting, not the whole of his army to Paris, but a chosen detachment of troops of the line. But the example of Fayette, taught him to regard this measure as a perilous extremity; and some legal form and pretence was wanting to give it colour, and to preserve him the confidence of his soldiers in the execution of it. He had declared, and written and repeated often to the leaders of the Girondine party, and especially to Barrere, who has since occasioned such mischief by his versatility, that, if the convention were overawed, they had but to write four lines in the form of a decree, and he would forthwith march 20,000 men to their assistance. Whether it were the effect of timidity, or a confidence in their own means and intrigues, the members that were still considered as the most respectable in the assembly were unwilling to employ this resource. Indeed their views, such as they have since been discovered to be, would naturally prevent them from placing much confidence in the General, whom they knew to be perfectly attached to the constitution and to the re-establishment of order. Seeing no hope of such a decree as the General had pointed out, and governed by the motives that have been amply detailed in the foregoing chapters, he departed singly for Paris; but he had sent before him, on leave of absence, many of the officers commanding corps, and other officers, and soldiers, both of the line and national guards, and among them some Parisians, all of whom had promised him their services in behalf of the king.

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It is to be observed also that at the time of his departure, although the trial of Louis XVI. was begun, it could not be foreseen, especially by one at the distance of an hundred leagues, that the issue would have been so speedy and fatal. The General well knew that the criminal ferocity of the Jacobins would incite them to press forward this hateful and bloody catastrophe by every means within their reach: but he thought that the Girondists, not for honest reasons, but for political reasons and for their own safety, would spin out this affair, and so give him time to take measures for the rescue of the king. It was not till his arrival at Paris that he knew the true state of things, and saw how inadequate his resources were to the magnitude of the task.

General Dumourier had been on terms of friendship with Genfonné, a deputy of the department of Gironde, and had found an opportunity of pardoning some hostile measures of that deputy toward him the preceding year, when Dumourier quitted the ministry. He had discovered in Genfonné great capacity and judgment and a humane disposition; and he willingly renewed his connections with him. General Dumourier opened his mind to him relative to the king. He expressed his horror at the crime that was about to stain the nation; he made him sensible that such a detestable triumph given to the Jacobins would end in the ruin of all the honest part of the nation, and would render the anarchy that afflicted France incurable; that such of the nations of Europe as had regarded with indifference and perhaps with pleasure our interior struggles, our war with Austria and Prussia, and perhaps were

were not unwilling to see our successes against those two powers, could not but be shocked at the barbarity of murdering Louis XVI.; and would be thenceforward engaged in honour to join the enemies of France, till we should have every power in Europe against us without one ally. These reflections seemed to make great impression on Genfonné; but, to whatever cause it was owing, he undertook nothing, and even avoided the General, who had afterward little opportunity of seeing him.

Dumourier conversed with several other deputies of the same party, as well as with many of the independent party in the Convention, to whom he represented that, the nation being now republic, Louis was to be treated simply as an individual; that it was indecent, impolitic, and unreasonable to waste time, that ought to be employed in preparations against the dangers of the ensuing campaign and in reinforcing the armies, in the prosecution of the trial of a single man, whose fate was of no importance to the nation; and that it would be wise at least to suspend this useless measure till after the war. The more reasonable of them acknowledged the trial to be an unjust and unwise proceeding, but said, that the members of the *Mountain* had taken their measures, and, should the trial now be abandoned by the Convention, the Jacobins would excite an insurrection, fall upon the temple, and massacre the whole of the prisoners. The General then told them that he could not think they were sufficiently authorized by their constituents to try the king; that, since they made an affair of consequence of the trial, it appeared to him it would be necessary to their own security to demand

demand instructions in precise terms on the point from the departments, least one day they should be reproached for the deed by the nation, and least they should one day become personally responsible for the irregularity and violence of the act. They answered to this, that the imprudent proposal of appealing to the people made by the Girondine party had deprived them of the resource the General now proposed; since it was feared the convoking of the primary assemblies for such instructions would be the signal of a civil war.

It then occurred to the General to suggest an idea that seemed to have great weight with these deputies, although in the end it failed of effect like all the rest, because every man seeing a poignard at his breast, chose rather to be a murderer than a victim. The idea was, that a long war had existed between the nation and the king, that the day of the 10th of August had decided the fate of both, that the king had fallen into their hands, and could no longer be considered as any thing but a prisoner of war, yet without criminality, because both parties had in like manner had recourse to arms; that a foreign war raged against the nation, and that they ought to deem themselves fortunate in having a precious hostage in this prisoner, who might serve them in a case of extremity. The General added, that should they persist in thinking the king guilty, they ought to form a tribunal authorized to collect facts, to examine and confront the witnesses, and to prepare the way for a final decision, with a deliberation due to the subject; that this act of justice would satisfy the bitterest enemies of royalty, would give the people time to reflect, and to the

the Convention an opportunity to finish the constitution, which was the grand object of their mission; and when the primary assemblies should be convoked for the acceptance of the constitution, all the proceedings of the tribunal might be laid before them, and they be called upon to decide the fate of the king.

Having spread this opinion in conversation and even in writing, the General saw Pethion, with whom till this period he had been on terms of friendship, and represented to him that it became him personally to interest himself in behalf of Louis XVI. since otherwise, a malignity of mind would be imputed to him that certainly was not in his character. Pethion appeared to be moved by the General's reasoning; and declared that personally he *loved* the king, and that he would exert his utmost influence to save him.

General Dumourier then addressed himself to Robespierre, by the medium of one of his friends. He represented that it was entirely in Robespierre's power to save Louis XVI. that the magnanimity of the action would immortalize his name, and that in consequence of it the generals of the army would look up to him as the first man in the state, and that the dictatorship would be the reward of his virtue; but that otherwise he would fall into the same contempt and execration as Marat, with whose name that of Robespierre would thenceforth be constantly associated. This idea the General knew to be peculiarly odious to Robespierre.

General Dumourier knew that the Jacobins despised the Convention and hated the Girondine party. He insinuated to them by secret agents, that if they wished to become masters
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of France and Europe, and to rise on the ruins of the National Convention, they had only to declare their will that the trial of Louis should be suspended, and that a more important object, the state of the war, should be taken into consideration.

Drouet, post-master of St. Menchould, who had arrested the king at Varennes, was a deputy of the Convention and a Jacobin. The brother of Drouet, a very honest and faithful man, was in the General's service, and was greatly attached to him. Dumourier gave this man instructions to prepare his brother's mind for the impressions he wished it to receive, and afterwards to bring him to Clichy. The General painted to Drouet the crime he and his associates were committing against the king, with such energy, that Drouet, struck with horror, promised to move for the suspension of the trial both in the Convention and in the club of the Jacobins. Had there been one member sufficiently resolute to make the proposition, the king had been saved. No one had the courage. Drouet fell sick and was not present when the sentence was past.

Each day the General visited various parts of Paris, went into the shops and houses of individuals, and took occasion always to turn the conversation to the king's trial. He observed how strange a circumstance it seemed that the Convention should suddenly become a tribunal; that if Louis were still king, the nation ought to decide by whom and with what forms he should be judged; that if he were no longer king, it was unfit that time so precious to the nation, should be lost in enquiring into the guilt of an individual. And to these considerations he added reflections on the

the mild virtues and misfortunes of Louis XVI. Sometimes he was listened to with eagerness and pity; but frequently, he was requested to forbear speaking of so *dangerous* a topic; and sometimes condemned for introducing it. At times, he exposed himself to serious danger by expressing his surprize, that in a great city like Paris, there should not be five or six thousand men with courage sufficient to rise against two or three thousand villains, who calling themselves Federates, held the city in absolute subjection. A well informed tradesman, casting down his eyes and blushing with shame, made this answer one day to the general: *Citizen, I see what you would have us to do. But we are cowards and the king will be sacrificed. What do you hope from a city that, having 80,000 armed men, suffered itself to be intimidated on the first days of September, by less than 6000 Marseillois and Bretons?* The general left the man's house, and retired to an unfrequented part of a public walk, to indulge in his melancholy reflections.

Those soldiers of his army that he met with from time to time, seemed to be devoted to revelling, and to be wholly infected with the phrenzy of the Federates; and some even joined the party of his enemies, filling the different clubs and meetings of the sections with absurd accusations against him.

From all these attempts to serve the king, which the general renewed every day in various forms and disguises, and with much risk to his own person, he reaped nothing but the dreadful certainty of the king's ruin. Paris seemed indifferent on the subject. During the twenty days previous to the death of the king, that he studied the temper of that city, he perceived not the smallest commiseration, neither among individuals nor in the pub-

lic, in behalf of the unfortunate Louis. Nor indeed any abstinence from their amusements in the frivolous and savage Parisians.

C H A P. VII

Death of the King.

ALTHOUGH General Dumourier's constitution was robust, his health yielded for a while to the acute vexations of his mind. On the 18th of January, he fell sick and was confined at his house at Clichy, till the 22d. He now resolved to quit Paris in a few days; and never to enter it more till he should come to disperse that unworthy assembly, who were base and wicked enough, wantonly, precipitately, and without proof, to condemn to death an innocent king, who had ever loved his people, whose faults were not his own, who had banished the torture from criminal trials, who readily adopted every proposal for the public benefit, and had himself invited the nation to remedy all abuses and to provide for its happiness. Kings are subject in common to many of the causes by which Louis XVI. was reduced to this unhappy

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py condition ; they are besieged and betrayed ; they are kept in ignorance and see nothing as it really exists ; nor have they power to quit the circle in which they are placed, in search of the virtuous man whose pure dignity shuns the corruption and insolence of courts. But it must have been the compleatest disorder that could hurry a whole nation to the murder of their king, after having often blessed and adored him ; and having compared him to Louis XII. Henry IV. and all the best and most beloved of their monarchs. The club of Jacobins conducted the French to this pitch of folly and wickedness.

The 21st of January, the day of the death of Louis XVI. is the true epoch of the ruin of the Republic, of the restoration of the monarchy, and it may be feared of the triumph of despotism. The French nation began the career of liberty gloriously. Their first excesses were pardonable, as they resulted from the obstinacy of the abuses it was necessary to destroy. A noble constitution, although in some degree it was imperfect, seemed to secure the happiness of France. General Dumourier's journeys into England, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy, at that period, convinced him of the general approbation it obtained. But the king, seduced by his perfidious counsellors, attempted to escape from his people, after having sworn to maintain the constitution. He was discovered and taken. The National Assembly of France acted as became a great nation. They restored the king to his rights ; and from that instant the king ceased to be dangerous to the liberties of the people. He was governed faithfully by the principles of the constitution. They were en-

graven on his heart. And if his ministers or his courtiers still sought to violate the law, the constitution had provided a remedy for the evil. The agents of the executive power were responsible with their lives for misconduct in the government, but an absolute inviolability was attached to the person of the king. The third legislature of France however, tended visibly to Republicanism; they were bent on the overthrow of the constitution. It was necessary to raise new accusations against the king for his destruction; and to this object the Girondine faction proceeded with the most refined perfidy, while the Jacobins openly acted in the same cause with a wild and brutal insolence. Carra and the journalists of the Jacobins, have placed this subject in the clearest light, in tracing the intrigues which engendered the catastrophe of the 10th of August.

The affair of the 21st of June, was a prelude to that catastrophe, although directly it produced nothing more than a disgusting insult to the nation and the constitution, in the unfortunate person of the king. The ferocious Santerre was heard to say on that day, *We have failed now, but we will return again.* The National Convention neither punished nor repented the insult. On the contrary, the two factions, which notwithstanding their mutual hatred had many wicked objects in common, were preparing for the execution of a greater plot; and had assembled the Marseillois and Bretons from the extremities of the kingdom, to ensure success.

These were the true causes of the bloody and decisive 10th of August. The ministers and generals,

nerals, it is true, took measures, on their part, against the Assembly, and the Jacobins; supposing however, that they were culpable, the law was armed against them, but ought to have had no operation on the king, who was both innocent and inviolable, and who was to be considered merely as the occasion and not as the author of the steps taken in his name. The nation was convinced of this truth; and if Louis had been firm he had not fallen. His assassins basely punished the mildness of his character with death; and the mildness of his character should have pleaded for mercy.

But this good and weak monarch found in his religious principles, a strength that bore him heroically through his martyrdom. The particulars of his death are preserved, and are inestimable aids in the study of the human heart. They add new aggravations to the crimes of the Parisians. An innumerable croud attended the execution. Barbarous joy or an unfeeling curiosity, were the only impressions that appeared in the guilty spectators. No one had the courage to shed a tear; and it will scarcely be believed, that the domestics of the good king pressed nearest to the scaffold, and were the most implacable of the multitude.

On arriving at Paris, on the 22d, General Dumourier went to the house of Garat, minister of justice, who seemed to be extremely affected by the death of the king, but more especially by the duty that had been imposed on him, and the other ministers, of reading the sentence to the king. The unfortunate Louis during the solemn office, remained standing, and assumed a tranquil and majestic countenance, without offering remonstrance

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or complaint. He said only, that it was not just to charge him with treason, since his intentions had always been pure; and since he had constantly desired the welfare of his fellow citizens. After requesting a little time to prepare for his death, he dismissed the ministers with an air of dignity and gentleness, the remembrance of which affected Garat very much in speaking of it. General Dumourier, Cabanis the friend and physician of Mirabeau, and the minister, were mutually affected. They read over the will of this unfortunate prince. It had been written with his own hand, in some places there were erasures, but the writing was clear, and without any marks of being written with agitation. It contained four pages written on letter paper. The first was consecrated to religion, and the homage was just; since, in that principle, he found courage, support, and consolation. The three other pages exhibited an example of magnanimity, reason and philosophy. This will, since published to the world, is one of the noblest writings that the mind ever produced under suffering circumstances. The monsters of the National Convention have said, that this writing justified the king's sentence; because, having no object in common with the world, on the point of becoming the victim of the ingratitude of his subjects, he had employed in two or three places the language of royalty and disdained to flatter their prejudices.

During the existence of a monarchy of fourteen hundred years the French have assassinated many of their kings. But the deed was always the crime of an individual; the rage of the nation against the perpetrator was extreme; and the villain was punished with the most horrible tortures. It was reserved

reserved to an enlightened and philosophical age to produce a like crime, committed in the name of the whole French nation, approved by the majority, and regarded as an act of Heroism.

Is the continuance and prosperity of a republic, founded on such guilt, soberly to be expected?—certainly not. The monsters have killed Louis XVI. but they have restored royalty. This inconsiderate and changable nation, always running to the extremes of passion, will herself massacre her iniquitous judges and her furious Jacobins, and run to adore new kings. The efforts for a reasonable liberty that have been made during three years by true Patriots will be lost; and France will present the picture of a monarchy crowded with disgraces and crimes, dismembered and ruined, in which a rigid despotism must long combat a destructive anarchy before the reign of laws can be restored; and then it shall not be the laws of the people. The whole of this generation, even those that are but newly born, shall endure the punishment of the atrocious crimes of four years: crimes that posterity will scarcely be persuaded to credit.

CHAP. VIII.

General Dumourier's Conference with Cambon.

HAVING particularly traced the transactions that most affected General Dumourier in a catastrophe that he could neither prevent nor foresee, it will be necessary to pursue the account of his other occupations in Paris during this unhappy month of January. An essential object of his journey

journey was to obtain the suppression of the decree of the 15th of December or at least a tacit agreement from the Convention that it should not be put in execution in Brabant. He demonstrated to the Convention that the people of Brabant were wholly alienated from the French ; that an open rebellion was to be feared if the decree should be executed ; that on the appearance of the Austrians in force the French would have an additional enemy in the Belgians, who might easily attack their weakened garrisons, cut off their provisions, and render their retreat impossible. The Convention were too presumptuous, and too much taken up with the king's trial to attend to these remonstrances.

One individual of the Convention controlled the department of the finances with the most absolute sway. This was Cambon a man of a most irregular mind ; ignorant and destitute of sound principles, yet scheming and unrelenting in his projects. D'Espagnac had been arrested on the 22d of November, along with Malus, for fulfilling an engagement that they had made with Servan respecting carriages for the army, and which was very important to the nation. He was still a prisoner at Paris ; but at liberty to go about with a guard. He possessed a mind abounding in resources. He had gained the confidence of Cambon on all the subjects of Finance, and offered to procure the General a conference with this dictator of the national treasury ; the General consented and they went to breakfast with Cambon. This man boasted of having obtained and supported the decree of the 15th of December. His reasons for the project he said were that the treasury was empty ; that France had six hundred thousand troops on foot, and

and paid two hundred millions of livres per month for the expences of the war. The General observed that six hundred thousand men ought not to cost two hundred millions per month and that the armies of France did not amount to more than three hundred thousand effective men. Cambon answered that the national guard of all the frontier cities received the same pay as the army, as well as part of the national guards of Paris; he declared he saw no other resource, than the execution of the decree for carrying on the war; that specie already cost the nation fifty per cent, and that soon it would not be procured even at cent. per cent; that he had but one remedy against this evil, which was to seize upon all the specie in Belgium, and the silver in the churches and banks. He acknowledged this to be unjust but he thought it unavoidable; he said that when the Belgians should be ruined and reduced to the same distress as the French, they would necessarily unite their fate with that of France, as the people of Liege had done, who threw themselves into our arms, being poor and involved in debt. He added, that then France would admit the Belgians as members of the republic, and with the same policy they might hope to proceed conquering people after people; that the decree of the 15th of December was well calculated for this purpose, because it tended to disorganize the neighbouring states, that being the most fortunate thing that could be done for France.

The general objected that, beside the barbarity of the project, it was impracticable; that we were now in the middle of the month of January; that our armies were weakened; that no one thought of the means of recruiting them; nor of
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the plan of the ensuing campaign, although on the eve of being opened ; that the people of Belgium were entirely averse to the disorganizing principles of our revolution ; that we had neither time before us to remove what he (Cambon) called their prejudices, nor to crush them ; that in the beginning of the approaching March, the enemy would attack the French posts upon the Meuse, which were too distant from each other, and not sufficiently strong ; that, masters of the passage of Maestricht, they would penetrate the center of the French line ; that the Belgians, finding a power to protect them, would take up arms every where at once, and would put to the sword the garrisons in the interior part of Belgium, composed of feeble battalions of new levies ; that, occupying the posts behind the French, they would not only cut off the provisions of the army, but its retreat ; that in this situation the army could not gain France, but would be entirely ruined, and thus all would be lost to the Republic. General Dumourier represented, moreover, that these odious robberies would not produce as much to France as would a just conduct toward the Belgians ; that it would be more prudent to borrow part of the treasures of the clergy, and so to interest them in our success, than to seize upon the whole by violence ; that, as to specie, there would be no necessity for sending any from France into Belgium, where it was in abundance ; that the true means of putting it in circulation, and at length to replace it by assignats, was to engage the rich merchants of Antwerp, Brussels, and Ghent, in the furnishing of provisions, cloathing, and all the necessaries for the war ; that, in this way, the supply of every thing

thing would be secured, and the expences reduced to one half; that the contractors would receive assignats in payment, and would be compelled by their own interest to give them currency. The general observed, that the Convention, by annulling the decree of the 15th of December, would effectually free the Belgians, whom they had reduced to a slavery more revolting than their former servitude; that in this case the Belgians would form a free constitution, raise troops, and join our arms; that this fraternity of arms and mutual services would induce them, more effectually than any other means, to demand at least a permanent alliance with the Republic, if not an entire union.

Cambon seemed inclined to yield, especially when the general promised him that, should these just, moderate and wise measures be adopted, he would not only forbear longer to demand any thing for his army, which the resources of Belgium could provide for in abundance, but that he would procure the French treasury several millions by way of loan. He well knew that the Belgians, to withdraw themselves from their present ruinous slavery, would fulfil the promises which he now made in their name.

After this first conference, Cambon went to the Convention, and, in the heat of the debate, said in the tribune, that if the decree of the 15th of December was not executed, it would be because Dumourier had opposed it by the prerogative of his *Veto*. Notwithstanding this dark treachery, in which, to render General Dumourier odious, Cambon assimilated him with the king, whose trial

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was then prosecuting with bitterness, the general consented to have another interview with him, and even invited him to dinner, together with a deputy named Ducos.

This second conference, which lasted more than six hours, was not carried on with much temper. General Dumourier having said that if Cambon was resolved upon oppressing the Belgians, he might seek another general, since Dumourier never would consent to become an *Attila* to a people who had received the French as friends and brethren; Cambon took an opportunity to tell the Convention that nothing could be more indecent than to hear a general threatening to resign in consequence of every decree that was past contrary to his opinion; that the Republic must not rest upon one man, and that they ought either to impose silence on the general or to punish him. In this fruitless manner terminated the general's conferences with Cambon, whom he expressly warned against the events that have since happened.

It was not without reason Cambon, had said, that he was devoid of resources for the war. In January, there was no more in the national treasury than an hundred and ninety two millions of livres in assignats, and from fifteen to twenty millions of livres in specie. These sums were not sufficient for the armies till the month of April, and the whole presumed value of the lands of the clergy was already consumed by the emission of assignats on that fund.

Dumourier acquired this knowledge in the second sitting of the committee of general safety. As it was then resolved to augment the army to three hundred and seventy thousand men, he represented to the committee that the de-

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cree for that purpose would be useless, as was the case with others of the same kind the preceding year, if the minister of war did not at the same time present a statement of the sums necessary for each particular article belonging to the augmentation, such as clothing, arms, horses, &c. and if the Convention did not place these sums at the immediate disposition of the minister of war. Cambon, who assisted at the sitting, acknowledged the truth of the general's observation, but stated the poverty of the treasury, and said he knew not on what fund to issue new assignats, since the only resource that remained was the national forests and the estates of the emigrants. Instantly, the violent part of the committee cried out they had nothing to do but to sell those estates forthwith. Disputes succeeding the general requested leave to give his opinion.

He desired the committee to consider that the lands of the clergy had sold exceedingly ill; that a part still remained unsold, the general apprehension being such that there were no buyers; that, if under these circumstances, they should order the sale of the estates of the emigrants, valued at more than 1200 millions of livres, this great addition to the lands on sale would still further diminish the value of the whole, and complete the ruin of the nation; that the discredit of assignats recently issued would be still increased by this fatal operation; since the public, judging by the price, of the lands, would doubt the sufficiency of the funds on which the assignats were grounded; for, supposing they should hazard the emission of 1200 millions on the estates of the

the emigrants, as some members had proposed, either they would not find purchasers or the produce of the sale would not amount to the third of the enormous sum; that then the state would lose the other two thirds of that sum, and would be menaced with inevitable bankruptcy.

As to the national forests, he represented that wood was already very scarce in France, and, if they alienated these forests, the purchasers would cut down the whole; that, besides the enormous consumption of wood for articles of every kind, France had not a sufficient quantity of coal for firing; and that, independent of this inconvenience, which France would feel for more than a century, this resource would not produce, at the utmost, more than two or three hundred millions of livres, although it stood valued at 800 millions.

The weight of these considerations was acknowledged, and it was agreed to leave these two objects untouched; and, thus, General Dumourier saved the estates of the emigrants for that time: but, neither this service, nor many others General Dumourier has rendered the emigrants, could ever obtain him justice or candour on their part.

The committee resolved upon proposing to the Convention the issuing of six hundred million of livres in assignats on the gross fund of all the national lands, without appropriating any specific part for the security.

This mode of issuing paper on vague funds is a dangerous practice in finance, and it was this kind of abuse of confidence which ruined *Law's* system in 1720. However, the committee had as yet kept it within bounds. It has since been carried to twelve hundred millions of livres.

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This is a smooth descent that leads to bankruptcy ; but bankruptcy is the last resource of Cambon. He has himself said that it is inevitable. As to the Convention they are not employed in considerations so profound. They have no object but to exist from day to day, without the trouble of inquiring what will be the result. In such hands is the richest kingdom in the universe !

CH A P. IX.

Interview of General Dumourier with some Jacobins.

DUMOURIER had been a member of the society of Jacobins in the early part of its career ; but, at that period, neither Marat, Camille Desmoulins, Bazire, Merlin, Chabot, nor Bourdon, were known in the society, nor the rest of that list of contemptible characters, afterward chosen, to the surprise of all just men, to form the most atrocious assembly in the universe. The General never attended their meetings very assiduously ; although the adventure of the *red cap*, which he was obliged to put on when he went to the Jacobin society on his being made minister, might beget an opinion that he was a zealous partizan of the sect.

The following is the history of the fact. Dumourier told the King, that he imagined it would be useful to the King's personal interest, but especially to the public concerns, for the

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new ministers, named by him on the recommendation of the people, and who were members of the Jacobin society, to present themselves to the society, lest they should now be suspected of joining the aristocracy; and he proposed to attend the sitting of that evening himself. The King perceived the importance of the measure, and approved of Dumourier's design. Some days previous to that, the factions had adopted the *red cap* for the emblem of liberty. Dumourier, and the Girondine party, who had hitherto professed to be the friends of order, and who, indeed, cannot be reproached with having flattered the Jacobins at any period, convinced Pethion, then mayor of Paris, then beloved by the Jacobins, then all-powerful, that this badge assumed by the people, might be productive of the greatest disorders, if not of the horrors attending the contest of the white and red roses in England, and that of the times of the hoods in King John's reign at Paris. Pethion, at that period, possessed an absolute ascendancy over Robespierre and the Jacobins; and promised that he would write a note to them on the subject, and that the red cap should be suppressed. The day on which Pethion was to write, was the same that Dumourier had chosen for paying his respects to the Jacobins. The letter was indeed written, but had not arrived when Dumourier entered the hall of the assembly. All the members had red caps on their heads, and a cap was offered to Dumourier as he was mounting the tribune. He was compelled to put it on, or imprudently to subject himself to very great risks. Dumourier said little in the tribune. Having assured them that, when war should be
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declared, he would quit his pen to serve them with his sword, he left the hall. He was scarcely gone, when Pethion's letter was announced and read, and produced the desired effect, in banishing the caps from the Assembly; so that half an hour would have saved the minister this disgrace. The public, misled by false royalists, that is to say, by the anti-constitutional party, have misjudged this fact, which was but a mere accident.

At the time of Dumourier's quitting the administration, the Jacobins were become his bitterest enemies. The General's success in Champagne, had restored him a little to their favour, in spite of Marat's accusations; and he appeared at the club, for a quarter of an hour, on his being at Paris, in October 1792. But he never held any correspondence with the society, nor with any one of its members.

Hassenfratz, Andouin, and the other clerks of the war-office, were never absent from the meetings of the Jacobins. They multiplied accusations against the General; and often demanded that he should be compelled to appear at the bar to answer their charges. But in the midst of these intrigues, the Jacobins were desirous of attaching the General to their party. The majority usually opposed his enemies; and, when Hassenfratz produced his grand accusation respecting the embezzlement of two hundred thousand livres, together with the papers to substantiate the charge, the society silenced him, and passed to the order of the day.

The Jacobins even employed several of their emissaries, to induce the General to attend their sittings. Anacharsis Clootz, used various arts to

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that end ; but the General always excused himself, on the ground that he could not appear at the society till he had offered his homage to the Convention. Doctor Seyffer made attempts of the same nature ; as well as Proli, an adventurer of Brussels, who was desirous of procuring at least an interview between the General and one Desfieux, a celebrated Jacobin, and one of the most active itinerants of the sect, who, arriving at Bourdeaux, found means of disgracing the members of the Girondine party, and of exciting the populace against the honest part of that great city. Jean-Bon St. Andre, who was a member of the Convention, and an enthusiastic Jacobin, notwithstanding he had the reputation of being an honest man, having conceived a great esteem for Dumourier, although he had no personal acquaintance with the General, was extremely anxious to bring about this interview, and requested that he might be present. The General was not satisfied that the adventurer Proli, whom he despised, should be the medium of this negociation ; however, for many important reasons, he, at length, consented to the interview.

On the day appointed, the General was indisposed ; but as he would not, by a violation of his word, seem to be wanting in respect to Desfieux and St. Andre, to both of whom he was a stranger, he made another appointment to meet them at the house of Bonne-Carrere, who was the intimate friend of these two persons.

The interview took place at the house of Bonne-Carrere. Desfieux appeared to the General to be a man of mean capacity, and of a violent disposition. Jean-Bon St. Andre seemed better

better informed, and more moderate. No arrangement could be made respecting the mode of the General's presenting himself to the Jacobin society; nor on the conduct the society would observe towards him, governed as it was by Marat. Dumourier, therefore, declined entering into any engagement to present himself to the society; nor did he make any declaration of a contrary intention.

As to the trial of the King, which the General feared to touch upon, excepting very slightly, lest he should injure the cause by seeming to be interested in it, he saw that Desfieux and Jean-Bonne St. Andre, were governed by savage rage against the King, which vented itself in the vilest and most unjust terms; and he perceived clearly, that he had nothing to hope on that point from these men.

They vehemently supported Pache and his associates, and Desfieux, who called himself the organ of the Jacobins, requested Dumourier to withdraw his accusations against the minister of war, whom the Jacobins, he said, were determined to preserve in his place; and invited the General to join their faction in disgracing Le Brun, Garat, Claviere, and above all, Roland; which ministers they considered as the agents of the Girondine party.

The General now resolved to break off these negotiations entirely; and informed Bonne-Carrere of his determination. But he felt the danger to which he should expose himself in taking this step; and especially in pursuing the plan he had laid down, and which he had announced to the Convention, of resigning the command. He well knew, that thenceforth he must either join the Jacobins, and become the

accomplice of their crimes, or deprived of the command, his only shield against his enemies, he should be pursued on the unjust accusations of Hassenfratz, and delivered over to the execrable Revolutionary Tribunal, that has since murdered Custine on the slightest pretences.

Dumourier therefore made up his mind upon the course he should pursue; and which he afterward adapted to the political circumstances that will be related in the following chapters. Losing all hope of saving the king, he now thought only of the means of avenging his death, of saving his unfortunate queen and her son, and, by the establishment of a limited monarch, of putting an end to the frightful disorders that were completing the disgrace and ruin of France.

CHAP. X.

Of the Executive Council of France.

IT was with the six ministers exercising the executive power in France, that General Dumourier transacted the chief part of his business during the twenty-six days that he passed at Paris. And here it will be necessary to observe that, in a writing he published after that period, by an error in the press, twenty-six hours were put for twenty-six days. In consequence of which error, a criticism appeared in one of the English papers, in which the general was seriously reproached with asserting he had performed, in twenty-six hours, the business of twenty-six days.

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The ministers were Roland, to whom we will give a chapter apart. He was hated by the other five, who concealed all they could from him. They were themselves divided into two very opposite parties. One was composed of Le Brun, minister of foreign affairs, whom Dumourier had made first clerk, and who was very fit for that situation, being industrious and well informed; but he had neither sufficient dignity nor energy of mind to act for himself, and was rendered deceitful by his timidity of character, even toward his benefactor, although he still regarded him as necessary to his support. He had dismissed from his office Marat and Noel, two men neither deficient in talents nor honesty; had appointed no person to superintend the business of the office, and to distribute the work to the different superior clerks; and he had taken for his principal secretary a man of the name of Isabeau, whose reputation was none of the fairest. Occupied, like ministers of former times, by intrigues for the preservation of his place, he was more influenced by the Jacobins than became a man, to whom Brissot, Condorcet, and the other heads of the Girondine party dictated the policy of his foreign negotiations.

Of the faction of Le Brun was Garat, minister of justice, a man of an able and upright mind, and to whom no reproach could be made excepting that, by an adulation unworthy of himself, he had endeavoured to apologize for the well known murders of the first days of September. Grouvelle, although only secretary of the council, may be considered as having all the influence of a minister, since he assumed much authority and gave his opinion, and decided on every thing. He was a man of letters, overbearing

ing, and open in his avowal of bold and extravagant notions of liberty.

On the other side was Pache, minister of war, a man of sense, and possibly an honest man, but ignorant and blindly devoted to the Jacobin party. He had a wife and daughter, equally ugly and ill tempered, who frequented the clubs and even the haunts of the Marseillois, to demand the king's death. The war-office was become a club, breathing nothing but blood and carnage. The clerks always wore the red cap at their desks, and used the phrases *thou* and *thee* to every one, even to the minister, who himself affected a slovenly dress, and courted the Parisian populace, by assuming their manners.

The same disgusting scene presented itself in the office of the Marine department, from which all the clerks of character and experience were driven, to make way for ignorant and furious Jacobins, who notwithstanding the filthiness of their appearance, had acquired immense fortunes.

The war-office and that of the marine department, united in presenting an address to the National Convention, signed also, as it was said, by the two ministers, demanding that the king should be put to death. Monge, the minister of the marine, was an academician, had been an excellent lecturer in hydrography, and seemed a man of simple manners, but was a little ungracious in his behaviour. He was entirely devoted to Pache; and, in concert with him, supported the Jacobin faction in the council.

Claviere, minister of the finances, although he was connected with and supported by the Girondists, and was the relation of Brissot, frequently joined the other faction, from a love of contradiction, and because it was the most active and powerful. Like the rest, he thought of nothing but
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of preserving his place, which Cambon, and the committee of finance were endeavouring to suppress.

Such was the executive council of France, in the most critical period of her existence. An obvious and sad reflection naturally presents itself; the French revolution, under the pretence of equalising all men, has debased all men. Most of the Jacobins, belonged to the lowest class of the people; and, unable to find among themselves persons equal to the first stations, they lowered the nature of those stations to their own level. Hence there is neither dignity, nor character, in the government: nor respectability, nor a sense of duty, in the people; and the populace, unlike the Athenian democracy, are drunken and savage slaves, usurping the place of the Spartans. The ancient government was destroyed to remedy the abuse of distributing places among the nobles, without any regard to their moral capacities. Yet, instead of the Revolution replacing them by men of talents, it has filled their seats with artful and impudent plebeians.

France cannot escape her entire ruin, but in freeing herself from the subaltern tyrants that invade every department. Unhappily, she no longer has the means in her own hands, since these tyrants are masters of the money, arms, power, and authority of the nation. But the ignorance and barbarous rage of this horde is destructive of itself; and foreign arms will restore the ancient despotism, instead of forming that just equilibrium between the talents of men and the employments of the state that constitutes the perfection of government. This state of things however, cannot remain long; because the love of liberty is too deeply

deeply rooted in France to be ever again wholly destroyed; and the restoration of despotism will beget another revolution, the moment that foreign troops shall be withdrawn from the country, and shall leave the nobles of France, scattered over that vast kingdom, to the vengeance of the people, called down on their heads by the abuse of their short lived triumph.

The council did not interfere in the fate of the king. Le Brun and Garat, seemed to apprehend the consequences of the trial; but they feared to employ the means, or to indulge in the idea, of putting a stop to it, or of suspending it; and confined themselves to a declaration, that it was unfortunate for France that such a trial had commenced. Roland was the most terrified of all the ministers at this trial; because, in reflecting on the imprudence, and on the injustice of his former complaints against the King, no doubt he felt that he was the principal cause of the King's danger. He relented and was silent. It belonged to the malignant mind of Claviere, to rejoice at the trial; and beside, he had always discovered a personal hatred against Louis XVI. As to Pache and Monge, they canvassed openly for the King's death. And Grouvelle declared, that it was necessary to the honour of the republic, that he should die.

The open and bitter quarrels that existed between the minister of war and the generals, on the complaints made by the latter respecting the armies, and the providing of necessaries for the troops, could never bring the council to take any step in its collective capacity relative to those subjects. Every one of the ministers reserved an exclusive authority in his own department; and Pache laid before the council, as well as before the
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the Committee of war, statements which were altogether false, and which were uniformly opposed by new complaints from the Generals, and by the reports of the Commissioners of the Convention with the armies. The council heard all the reports and complaints, but they still upheld the committee of contracts, which was secretly influenced by Claviere, the friend of Bidermann, who was at the head of the committee; and the affairs of the armies were conducted as before. No provision was made either for the cloathing, subsistence, or accoutrements of the troops, nor for the hospitals, nor for the ammunition that was wanted in the frontier places, nor for the works necessary to put them in a state of defence. At that time, the Jacobins had resolved to place one of their faction at the head of the municipality, and had promised to make Pache mayor of Paris; he, therefore, gave himself little uneasiness respecting the future embarrassments of the war department; which Hassenfratz and Meusnier were to quit along with him.

The more we reflect on the conduct of the Jacobins, the more are we lost in conjecture respecting the spirit by which they were guided. It is certain, that they have been continually industrious to disorganize France, and to render useless the immense resources she possessed for the defence of her liberty; they have ruined the fleets and armies; they have imprisoned or driven out of the kingdom, the ablest officers; they have lavished the treasures of the nation in wild and ineffectual expences; they have destroyed the commercial and political connections of France with other nations; and have set every nation at defiance;

defiance; and it cannot be doubted, that the society has been influenced by English, Italians, Flemings, and Germans, pretending to be furious Jacobins, and who were known to be the spies of foreign governments. In this class may be ranked Cloutz, Marat, Chabot, Pio, the Jew Ephraim, De Buscher, and many others.

The decree of the 15th of December, far from being disapproved of by the council, was supported by every one of the members. Le Brun had been secretary to the people of Liege, during this revolution, to which he had given his support, by a periodical work, entitled, "The Journal of Europe." This paper was not ill written; and it was in consequence of seeing it that Dumourier had placed him at the department of foreign affairs. Le Brun was of opinion, as well as most of the other revolutionists of France, that a revolution could not be successful without being attended by a complete disorganization; so that he could not fail to approve of a decree, calculated to disorganize a people, who had the misfortune to call upon us for aid. The principles of Dumourier, which inclined him to respect the liberty, property, and opinions of others, could not be very acceptable to Le Brun. But Le Brun was silent on the subject to Dumourier although he, in concert with Marat, Chepy, and his other emissaries, had established a destructive engine in Belgium, under the name of the Revolutionary Committee. The General complained to the minister of the language and conduct of Chepy, desiring he might be recalled, as being dangerous to the affairs of France in Belgium. Le Brun, however, not only countenanced Chepy, but gave him new instructions that greatly extended his power.

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In the same manner, while the General was soliciting the revocation of the decree of the 15th of December, the council appointed, on the recommendation of the Jacobins, thirty-two commissioners of the Executive Power, to whose situation was annexed the salary of 10,000 livres, beside the expences of* their journey, and the profits of their robberies. These commissioners were furnished with ridiculous instructions, in which the council feigned to confine their authority within narrow bounds; but the commissioners paid no regard to their instructions, having themselves given an arbitrary latitude to their power. These miscreants inflicted the greatest wrongs on the Belgians, and caused among that people an utter abhorrence of the French name.

The plan of the campaign remained yet to be settled. Cambon had asserted that France maintained 600,000 troops. It was now the 15th of January, and the council neither knew how many troops France really had on foot, nor how many enemies she would have to contend with, in the campaign. The general stated to the council that, although all Europe should declare against France, she having no civil war, (for the revolt in La Vendee had not yet broken out) might defend her frontiers with three hundred and seventy thousand men (the sixth part of them being cavalry) exclusive of the garrisons and troops of the fleet, by standing on the defensive on the south and on the banks of the Rhine, and confining their offensive operations to the frontiers extending from the Mozelle to Dunkirk. The general proposed to distribute the troops in
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the following manner : 80,000 men to compose the army of Belgium ; 40,000 men that of the Ardennes ; a corps of 20,000 to be posted on the Mozelle, to keep open the communication between the armies of the Ardennes and that of the Rhine ; 50,000 to compose the army of the Rhine ; a reserve of 20,000 men to be placed at Chalons or Soissons ; a corps of 15,000 at Lyons, to watch Switzerland and Piedmont ; 40,000 for the army of Savoy and countries of Nice and Provence ; 25,000 for the army of the Pyrennees ; 40,000 for the coast of the West, from Bayonne to Brest ; and 40,000 for the coasts along the channel, from Brest to Dunkirk. All these armies might mutually assist each other ; and, as the whole of France was armed, even should the enemy penetrate any part, it was not to be doubted they would be repulsed or overwhelmed.

General Dumourier also proposed that Custine's army, which had already evacuated Francfort, should fall back upon Landau, leaving a garrison in Mayence sufficient to compel the king of Prussia to lose three or four months before that place, which would afford time to put the fortified towns of Alsace, Lorraine, and the Ardennes, into a proper state of defence, and to make the enemy on that side lose the rest of the campaign.

The general further proposed that the greatest efforts should be made to push the campaign on with vigour on the side of Belgium, because that being a flat country without fortified places, or even without any of those naturally strong situations of country, which stand in the place of fortresses, the fate of the war in these provinces must be decided by battles. On this scheme, if the French should be victorious,

rious, the greater part of the French army might pass the Rhine; and if unsuccessful, might retire behind the fortresses of Flanders and Artois; however the whole campaign might pass without the French lines being broke in upon in this quarter.

Instead of this plan, which Dumourier laid before the Committee of General Safety, as well as the Executive Council, La Clos, who had just been appointed to the command in India, proposed that they should instantly send him out with 15 vessels and 15,000 men, which measure necessarily involved a war with England and Holland, although it had then been very easy and was very necessary to the safety of France to have avoided that war.

The object of this expedition of La Clos was to make himself master of the Cape of Good Hope and the Island of Ceylon; and afterward, to join Tippoo Saib and to attack Bengal.

Kellermann, on paying his respects to the National Convention, on his departure to take the command of the army of Dauphine, which amounted to nearly twenty thousand men (exclusive of the army of the country of Nice, under General Biron, from ten to twelve thousand men) received orders from the president to go and conquer Rome; and the general gravely answered, that he took his leave to go to Rome. This army had also been weakened by drawing between seven and eight thousand men from it, for the fleet that lay at Toulon, destined to conquer Sardinia. This expedition was undertaken in the most stormy part of the year, in a narrow sea, abounding with rocks and islands; and part of the fleet was lost and the expedition failed.

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The army of the Pyrenees consisted only of an extensive establishment of staff officers, without troops. Yet the Convention had resolved upon conquering Spain, and had destined 40,000 men, that were not raised, and General Servan, for the purpose. There were no troops on the coast of the west and north ; excepting some weak garrisons at Belleisle, and at two or three other places on that coast. There was no army of reserve. Fifty thousand men were wanting to complete the army of Belgium and that of the Ardennes ; the army of Alsace did not amount to 20,000 men, exclusive of 22,000 shut up in Mayence ; and the army of the Moselle did not amount to 12,000 men.

In order therefore to put the plan of General Dumourier in execution there were wanting more than 150,000 men ; together with the provisions, arms and clothing for this large body of troops. Above all, France was in want of cavalry. The armies of Belgium and of the Ardennes required a body of 20,000 cavalry ; and the two armies had not 6,000 ; and they were in want of 15,000 artillery horses.

The general's plan was adopted ; the 370,000 men were decreed to be raised ; and a few alterations made in the distribution of the troops ; but this was all that ever was done toward the execution of the plan. However, the general obtained an order a few days before his departure for 15,000 men of the new-raised battalions to march from the third line in Picardy, Flanders and Artois, where they were altogether useless, into maritime Flanders.

Independent of the Executive Council, from which (as Le Brun and Garat suspected) a great many

many projects were concealed, especially those respecting foreign politics, there were two private committees held at the house of General Dumourier, which seemed to dispose of the fate of the empire ; and which in fact produced nothing. They were composed of the two ministers Le Brun and Garat and those members of the Girondine party, Condorcet, Pethion, Gensonne and Brissot. It is probable that the only object of the party, in establishing these committees, was that their existence should be known to Paris, in order to beget an opinion that the general was entirely devoted to them; and thereby to strengthen the party, by the acquisition of his friends. Le Brun even seemed unwilling that the negociations then carrying on with England and Holland should be at all enquired into by the committees; and requested the general to forbear touching on the subject; and it was never introduced.

Brissot boasted of his plans for the conquest of Spain and Italy; but the general easily detected the folly of his calculations.

The situation of the republic with Switzerland, was an interesting subject. The malignity of Claviere, had been lately gratified, in compelling General Montesquieu to become an exile to escape the fangs of his persecutor the vile Du Bois de Crance; and, in disorganizing Geneva, his native country. Brissot and his adherents maintained, that it was necessary to compel the Swiss Cantons, to abandon their neutrality; or, in case of refusal, to attack them; and it is probable that in this they were acted upon by the agents of the combined powers, to whom it was very important that Switzerland should join the confederacy. The general proved by arguments, drawn from
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the relative situations of France, Switzerland, and the Combined Powers, to which these metaphysicians were strangers, that it was prudent to conciliate the good dispositions of the Helvetic body towards France ; yet, at the same time, to maintain an army of 15,000 men to cover Lyons, and to be ready on any emergency on that side.

Dumourier was the more desirous of preserving this neutrality, because it was during his administration, that the event of the disarming the regiment of Ernest happened at Aix. At that period, he made every compensation he could to that brave regiment, for the injustice of his countrymen ; he presented the red ribband to the two principal officers, and provided for the safety of their retreat with their men to the frontiers.

General Dumourier always exerted every means in his power to preserve peace with Switzerland ; a measure that was so just, and so necessary to the welfare of the two nations. But he must own, that his efforts have less contributed to that difficult task, than the prudent and firm conduct of Colonel de Weifs, a member of the sovereign council of Berne, and a writer distinguished by works which display extensive knowledge, energy of mind, and goodness of heart. This officer, without possessing any ostensible diplomatic character, was respected by the ministry, was listened to in the committees, and had even acquired an influence in the Convention. Tranquil when surrounded by danger, and uncorrupted in the midst of crimes, he had the courage to say to one of the leaders of faction, *I know that you can cause me to be arrested or massacred ; but proofs of your villainy that would bring you to the scaffold in eight days, are within my reach : I demand that a peacea-*
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ble conduct on the part of France, toward my country, be the price of my silence.

On another trying occasion, when a superior officer had bluntly interrupted him, in the midst of a sentence, to demand if, daring to speak the language he held, he had a 100,000 men at his beck in the Fauxbourgs of Paris, *No*, he answered haughtily, *I am single ; but I have a hundred thousand republican sentiments in my heart of which you are destitute.* He was applauded by his audience; and continued his discourse.

His work entitled, *A rapid survey of the relative interests of the Helvetic body, and the French Republic*, which was published in a crisis of great danger to both countries, exposed and defeated the hostile projects of a faction, towards Switzerland, on the eve of execution ; and it is very probable that, without the foresight and courage of Colonel de Weifs, war had been declared against the Helvetic body before the end of February. Various secret preparations were already making for an attack upon Switzerland, in pursuit of an ill digested plan of Robert, Claviere, and other Swiss emigrants. The attack was to be made on three points at once. A column, composed of part of the army of the Upper Rhine, and augmented by new levies, was to take Basle by surprise, or assault, and keep the Austrians in check. Another column, drawn from the army of the Alps, was to blockade Geneva, where the French had numerous partizans, and to penetrate by Versoix into the Pays de Vaud. The third division, composed of chosen troops, was to march suddenly by the Pass of Porentru, already occupied by the French, against Berne, whose treasury, granaries, and arsenal, excited the cupidity of the projectors of this plan. Berne had been already

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secretly reconnoitred ; and, although it be nearly surrounded by a rapid and deep river, it was expected that the place would be carried, by pouring in bombs and red-hot balls from the neighbouring heights, before the Swiss militia could assemble with force to oppose the attack. The projectors of the plan also expected a powerful diversion to be made in their behalf, by the discontented party, (whose numbers were greatly exaggerated) of the Lower Valais, Neuf-Chatel, Pays de Vaud, Soleure, Lucerne, and Fribourg. This last city was destined to be an object of signal vengeance, on account of some offence she had committed respecting the assignats. The popular governments were to be informed that these hostilities would not affect them, and that France would continue to preserve peace with them. As to the other cantons, the commissioners and seditious preachers were to overthrow their constitutions, stir up the poor against the rich, massacre, imprison, or banish the magistrates and principal citizens, seize upon specie, provisions, horses, and arms, compell men of property to emigrate that their estates might be confiscated, outrage religion, and in the name of liberty and the public good to ruin this free and happy people, and reduce them to slavery. The expedition was to have been prompt ; but the explosion was prevented, and Claviere and Brissot, overawed by Weis, laid aside a project in which Switzerland, from the character of the times, had every thing to hazard.

The conquest of Rome and Spain, were deferred till armies could be raised to march against those countries. As to all other affairs, the sittings of these two committees were as fruitless as were the deliberations of the committee of general safety, and those of the executive council.

Dumourier

Dumourier could not, by any motive, obtain of them the accomplishment of any object, calculated to serve the nation.

CHAP. XI.

The Retreat of Roland from the Administration.

AT the time of the king's death, Roland, who had long strove to maintain his situation in the ministry, against the will of the Jacobins, as well as against the real inclinations of his own party, sent a letter to his colleagues announcing his resignation. The ministers never appeared more chearful than on the day they received this letter, and the council appeared more like a school relieved from the restraints of a troublesome pedant, than a grave meeting of Statesmen. Roland's resignation, made part of a compromise between the Jacobin and the Gironde parties, in which it was agreed, that both, Roland and Pache should quit the ministry. But the consequences were very different to those two ministers, the latter of them acquiring a situation of more real importance than any in the ministry; while the former remained more than ever exposed to the insults and persecutions of the Jacobins.

This sacrifice made of Roland by his party, is another instance of the cowardice of that faction, who ought never ought to have abandoned a man, of whose services they had availed themselves without any respect to his peace or safety. In truth, the whole conduct of Roland, in his public character, was a mistaken policy, which exposed himself and his party to continual danger. Roland did not possess much strength of mind,
but

but had acquired extensive information on the different branches of trade and manufactures; and, if it had been expedient to divide the duties of the administration of the home department, which was too extensive and too complicated for a mind of such little energy, it is probable, he would have made an excellent minister of commercial concerns. He was upright in his designs, and was possessed of a mild and philanthropic disposition; but the desire of appearing a rigid moralist induced him to assume a severity of character unnatural to him. He hoped to resemble Cato the Censor, and had adopted his turn of conversation, at once cold and repulsive, but without the genius and boldness of that celebrated man. In his dress he was nice and singular, following the fashions of former times; but this was at least less displeasing than the slovenly affectation of the Jacobins. His deportment was grave, and not unbecoming the dignity of his station. He was indefatigable in the application of his talents. But he loved too much to gratify the will of the people, and was too ready to believe that the higher orders were oppressive and unjust; and this disposition, that becomes dangerous when it is too generally indulged, conducted him habitually into precipitate and imprudent measures. He was candid in his examination of the subjects belonging to the other departments of the government, such as those relating to the armies, the marine, and foreign negotiations; and supported, with great sincerity, all propositions that came before the council of a just and reasonable nature. Perceiving the equivocal conduct of the other ministers, mistrusting their talents and perhaps their good faith, he would no longer admit of any responsibility of the council in a collective capacity; and

and his pertinacity in refusing to answer for any measures but those that were the consequence of his direct orders begat a greater hatred of him than ever among his colleagues.

The temper and qualities of Roland would have fitted him well enough for the ministry had the republic been settled on its foundations, and if the times had been more free from the violence of party rage, for he was a rigid republican. This disposition was the cause of his ill conduct to Louis the XVI. and of that imprudent step of delivering into the hands of the Convention the fatal chest containing the monarch's *passive* * correspondence, in which those base men found pretexts for the martyrdom of that unfortunate prince.

Perhaps it was prejudicial to the interests of Roland that he was governed by his wife, who was a woman of fine talents, and whom he acknowledged to be the critic, that gave a polish to his numerous works; but certainly it was among his misfortunes to be surrounded by ignorant and designing journalists, who composed, under his directions, those verbose harangues that covered the walls and public buildings of Paris; for the Jacobins had the address to turn this engine of faction against him and his party.

* *Passive*! Such is the word in the original, and it is printed in Italics. Dumourier seems to have thought that Louis XVI. was innocent, because he had not courage or capacity to *contrive* the means of injuring the nation. Supposing he is not mistaken in that conclusion, he seems to have forgotten, that he was conceding one of the great points, insisted upon by the friends of Democracy, that it is in vain to have an innocent king, if his ministers, mistresses, wives, or favourites, be not innocent also; as it would be in vain that these latter should be innocent, if the king be avaricious, deceitful, or tyrannical.

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Among the women who have risen to celebrity during the French revolution, no one has acted a more conspicuous or noble part than that of Madame Roland. She was between thirty and forty years of age, had a lively and healthy countenance, and a most interesting figure; she dressed with great taste; conversed with ability, although perhaps with too much wit and refinement; she was innocently gay, and had placed herself at the head of a party consisting of metaphysicians, scholars, members of the Convention, and ministers. Every day these partizans of Madame Roland paid their respects to her, and on the Friday of every week they dined at her house, where the conduct and politics of statesmen took their character from Madame Roland's opinions. None of the wives of the other ministers were admitted to these meetings.

It would be unjust not to notice the spirit with which Madame Roland conducted herself under an insult of the Jacobins, at a time when her husband's name had already fallen into great discredit. Interrogated at the bar of the Convention, respecting the injurious accusations of an unprincipled man named Viard, she said, *I am the wife of citizen Roland; I bear the name of a virtuous man, to whom I am proud to be allied.* Certainly it required all the malignity of the Jacobins to persecute such a woman.

Although Madame Roland possessed much good sense, she permitted it to be seen that she governed her husband, and thereby did a disservice to his reputation, for which she could not compensate by the value of her councils. It was Madame Roland that selected Pache and Lanthenas to aid her husband in his administration; and the former

mer of them so entirely gained the confidence of Roland, that he was appointed minister of war through Roland's interest. Pache was no sooner the colleague of Roland, than he became his enemy, and sought by every means to ruin him, and for that purpose he did not hesitate to become the partisan of the most intemperate men among the Jacobins. The contest between those two ministers was open, and their hostile attacks was without measure or decency. They both descended from their situations, but with Pache it was only to rise to higher power. Roland was to be subjected to new and more bitter misfortunes.

Other women have also distinguished themselves during the revolution, but without the dignity that has been preserved by Madame Roland ; excepting, indeed, it be Madame Necker, who, in many respects, may be considered as the rival of Madame Roland's fame, and whose age and experience, if it rendered her less agreeable to the thoughtless, gave her the advantage as the counsellor of her husband. Mademoiselle La Brousse, Madame de Stael, Condorcet, Pastoret, Coigny and Theroigne, were either artful females, like those who haunted the courts of former times, or differed in nothing from the vulgar and furious women of the Fauxbourgs of Paris.

One unfortunate woman, Elizabeth Corday, has consigned her name to history, by an act, which happily for humanity will find few imitators, although it delivered the earth from a monster.

The executive council seemed to have undergone no change by the retreat of Roland from the ministry. During a considerable period before his resignation, he had been entirely occupied

pied in brooding over his vexations, the attacks of his enemies, and the means of his defence. Every satire of the Jacobins that was directed against him, begat in his apprehension the obligation of justifying himself to the Convention ; and the members of the Convention, who, perhaps, were more irritated by the austerity of Roland's virtue, than by the petulance of his spirit, saw nothing in those homilies but an insupportable pride. His own party, no longer deriving reputation from his name, had, in truth, renounced him ; and had very ignorantly resolved to sacrifice him. Roland flattered himself that his resignation would not be accepted, and he remained in the house appropriated to the minister of the Home Department, till he was no longer permitted to doubt of his fate. During the latter part of his administration, he seldom slept in this house ; as the Jacobins, to terrify him, frequently sent bands of the federates to make excursions during the night round the house. In this manner were the representatives of the executive power treated in France. Le Brun and Claviere have been since accused and imprisoned ; and Garat was accused and arrested after having resigned. So ferocious has been the character of this revolution that, of the men who have had an eminent part in it, such only have been out of the reach of a violent death as have fled and are in exile.

CHAP. XII.

Negotiations with Holland and England.

FRANCE, at that period, had no other declared enemies than Austria, Prussia, and Sardinia. She had displayed a superiority over those powers during the preceding campaign which would have been entirely decisive, if, according to the plan of General Dumourier, Custine, instead of passing the Rhine to levy an inconsiderable contribution on Frankfort, and for which France paid so dearly, had made himself master of Coblenz, where there was no garrison; and if the wants of the army had been supplied, so that the army of Belgium might have taken up its winter quarters along the banks of the Rhine, from Cleves to Cologne; that of the Ardennes, from Cologne to Andernach; that of the Moselle, from Andernach to Mayence, including Coblenz; and that of Alsace, from Mayence to Landau, including Spires. This position would have compelled the county of Luxembourg to have surrendered, by cutting off its supplies of provisions. The armies would have had behind them a country on which, whether it were neuter or an enemy, they might long have subsisted; and, by opening the campaign early in the spring, might have passed the Rhine without difficulty, and have penetrated into the center of Germany, where the French would have been received with open arms, if they had possessed the prudence to have forbore from exciting terror in the inhabitants

tants by unjust decrees and by the sending of rapacious commissioners to commit violence, insults and robberies.

This great plan was neglected; yet France might have sustained herself with reputation and effect against her enemies who were in truth already overcome, if her conduct had not drawn new enemies upon her.

A means existed, at that period, for preserving Spain in her neutrality; and by employing it the nation would have spared herself the guilt of a great crime. The king of Spain engaged with the Convention to remain neuter, on condition that the life of the unfortunate Louis XVI. should be spared. This step does honour to the Spanish monarch; and it is difficult to imagine why the French princes did not follow so bright an example. The implacable, ignorant Convention rejected the terms of the Spanish monarch with disdain, and thereby committed a new crime against the nation, by creating her a new enemy, without consulting her on the necessity or prudence of their conduct.

The courts of London and the Hague, had for some time betrayed a hatred to the French revolution; and the death of Louis XVI. could not but increase that hatred. But, in England, no part of the nation was willing to enter into a war against France, excepting the king, who considered his differences with the French as a personal quarrel. And in Holland, every party dreaded to be drawn into a war. It was therefore possible for France to preserve peace with those two countries; and, till that period, she had wisely cultivated the good will of Holland, from whence she drew specie and provisions; and it was easy to have continued that system,

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In the latter end of the month of November, General Dumourier proposed to the executive council, the taking of Maestricht, without which he could neither defend the Meuse nor the country of Leige. He thought it reasonable, after many examples in former wars, to take and hold this place, engaging by a duly authorised manifesto, to restore it at the end of the war. At that period his army was victorious and full of ardour. He had, after the taking of the citadel of Antwerp, assembled the whole of his heavy artillery at Tongres and Leige, in order (not to expose the horses belonging to the artillery to die for want of forage, as the Jacobins have stupidly asserted) but to make himself master of Maestricht. That place was not as yet palisadoed, nor provided with a garrison, nor with any thing necessary to sustain a siege. Venloo was in the same condition. Causes of complaint were not wanting to give a colour to the enterprize; and to throw the imputation of being the aggressors upon the Dutch, if they should resent his conduct, for they had already frequently violated the neutrality, and had recently prohibited on pain of death, all exportations of provisions to France, while provisions in immense quantities were drawn from Holland, to establish magazines, on the Lower Rhine, for the Imperialists and Prussians. The executive council rejected the general's propositions, and expressly commanded him to preserve the strictest neutrality toward Holland which injunction the general was punctual in observing. They then sent him an order to undertake the siege of Luxemburg during the winter; but, the general shewing the absurdity of the plan, it was not put in execution.

As the executive council had thus neglected the opportunity of seizing upon Maestricht, which may be regarded as the key of the Netherlands on the side of the Meuse, the general was of opinion that it would no longer be prudent to commit any hostility on the part of France against Holland, being convinced that a war with England must be the consequence of such hostility; and his advice was thenceforward to preserve a neutrality with both England and Holland, with the utmost solicitude.

The friendship of Holland was indispensably necessary to enable France to hold Belgium, for if the Dutch delivered the passages of Maestricht and Venloo to the Austrians, the Meuse would be no longer tenable, and the French would be compelled to abandon the countries of Leige, Gueldres, Limbourg, Brabant, and Namur, and retreat behind the Scheld; contracting their lines within the country lying between the citadel of Antwerp and Valenciennes. And in the case of the English and Dutch assembling an army in Dutch Flanders, the French would be further forced to abandon the Scheld, and retire behind the river Lys, and under the fortified places of French Flanders and Artois.

At this time there were at Paris many Dutch refugees, victims of the Dutch revolution, and of the faithless and feeble conduct of the minister Brienne. Many among them were respectable and opulent men, who assured the French ministry that their party in Holland was much more considerable than that of the Stadtholder, which indeed was true. These representations were dis-
regarded

regarded till the month of January, when Le Brun, after giving them an hearing, referred them to General Dumourier for his opinion respecting their resources, and especially respecting a plan of invading Zealand, which the Dutch patriots represented as easy to be undertaken, and certain of success. After a deliberate examination the general judged the plan to be impracticable, but wrote to the minister that he would postpone giving a definite answer till he should be at Antwerp; and be able more particularly to examine the several parts of the project; and it was resolved that the Dutch refugees should proceed to Antwerp with their revolutionary committee; and orders were given to the Dutch legion, consisting nearly of 10,000 men, to garrison Antwerp, and to be ready to form the advanced guard of the French army, in case of a war with Holland.

An agent of Le Brun was appointed to attend the Dutch revolutionary committee; but no positive engagement with them was entered into, and all that related to them was rendered dependent on the issue of a negotiation which was then on the point of commencing.

At the time that Dumourier had been minister for foreign affairs he had sent to the Hague, as minister plenipotentiary, Emanuel de Maulde, a colonel in the French army, who had conducted himself with great prudence and ability, had procured arms and horses for France, and had so well reconciled his attention to the interests of the refugees with the respect due to the government of the country, as to acquire the confidence and esteem of the two factions that divided Holland.

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This conduct, which was conformable to his instructions, was too moderate to be agreeable to the temper of the present times; and de Maulde had moreover the misfortune to be noble. Le Brun in particular conceived an aversion to him. The military committee disapproved of his sending fuses to Dunkirk. His measures were opposed on every side, and his intentions calumniated. He was recalled; and in his room was appointed Noel, whom the general had made principal clerk in the office for foreign affairs. Noel, although an extremely honest man, arriving with prejudices against de Maulde and plans much less moderate than those on which Maulde had acted, was very ill received; and, attributing his reception to de Maulde, became his enemy and accuser.

De Maulde, on his arrival at Paris, called upon the general; and told him that, if France desired to preserve a neutrality with Holland and England, nothing was more easy; that, altho' the ministers of the two courts would neither acknowledge the National Convention, nor treat with Le Brun, yet the grand pensioner of Holland, Van Spiegel, and the English Ambassador, Lord Auckland, had charged him to declare that they would willingly treat with General Dumourier.

At the same time, Benoit, who had been agent of the French ministry at London, and had just arrived from that place, informed Le Brun on the part of Talleyrand, late bishop of Autun, De
Talon,

Talon, and other French emigrants, who had political connections with the British ministry, that Pitt and the council of St. James's had nothing more at heart than to treat for the preservation of the neutrality, provided that General Dumourier should be charged with the negociation, and should proceed to England for the purpose of settling its terms, which he might easily accomplish before the opening of the campaign.

This overture of the English ministry was, at first, communicated to no other person of the Executive Council than Garat and Le Brun. Garat, who was possessed of a sound judgement, zealously embraced the offer, and proposed to send the general as ambassador extraordinary to England, without however superseding Chauvelin, with instructions to demand a decisive answer respecting war or peace. The king's trial was not yet concluded, but the cruel catastrophe was sufficiently foreseen; this circumstance suggested new considerations to Garat, who feared that the English court might be treacherous enough to detain Dumourier in England, and thereby deprive France of her best general. Dumourier was compelled to dissemble that he also saw the probability of that event, and that it was the only thing he desired. In order that he might escape from the hands of the miscreants who governed his country. He appeared to subscribe to the prudence of Garat's precaution. It was, however, determined that the affair should be laid before the council, and a proposition be made by Garat to

to send General Dumourier as Ambassador extraordinary to London, in consequence of the overtures made by the ministers of England and Holland; to give the General instructions to conduct the negociation with suitable dignity and with promptitude, and whatever might be the issue, to return instantly to put himself at the head of the armies. It was resolved to demand from the English ministry every possible security for the person of General Dumourier, and for the full liberty of returning at his pleasure.

When the proposition was laid before the council, Claviere, Pache and Monge opposed it in the most decided manner, undoubtedly incited by jealousy and love of opposition, for they well knew the distress of their respective departments and their incapability of supporting a war that would become so general.

Dumourier was extremely afflicted with the fate of a measure which seemed to have promised his deliverance, as well as an important occasion of serving his country; but he was not discouraged. He was of the opinion of Garat and le Brun that the design should not be discussed any more in the council, but prosecuted secretly till it should be in a state to ensure success. It was agreed that de Maulde should depart instantly for the Hague, under the pretence of his private concerns; that Noel should be recalled and placed elsewhere; that the General should charge de Maulde with a letter for Lord Auckland, informing him that the General would be at Antwerp on the 1st of February to visit his troops in their winter quarters, and that having learnt from de Maulde, his friend, that Lord Auckland had spoken of him with esteem and confidence, it would be a circumstance of great pleasure to him if an opportunity should offer of

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meeting that nobleman on the frontiers, and that perhaps this interview might be beneficial to the interests of the two nations, and the cause of humanity. It was also determined that, should Lord Auckland receive this invitation with the good will that was to be expected, the General should give him a meeting, and might even if it was found necessary pass into England.

It was further decided, that Maret, who had already been several times in England, should be sent to London, to learn from Mr. Pitt if he really desired to treat personally with General Dumourier. Chauvelin, minister plenipotentiary of France to the court of London, did not at all accord with Talleyrand, who had been sent with him as an adviser in his negotiation, and had not at all succeeded in the object of his embassy, which he was ambitious of conducting without the participation of his colleague. Many indeed were the obstacles Chauvelin had to encounter; he had against him the prejudices of the English nation; the king of England, the most — —* in Europe, and the most enraged against the French Revolutionary; the French emigrants; the persons who had been given him as advisers and assistants; the National Convention of France; and his own inexperience. It was thought necessary if Dumourier's journey should take place to sacrifice Chauvelin, or rather, to give him some other embassy; for Dumourier, who had been the intimate friend of his father, and had given him the appointment to England, insisted that he should be sent to Venice or Florence, that he might continue his diplomatic career with success.

It appears to be but just to say a word here of the disposition that Dumourier has always displayed in his public character.

* Despotique.

Whether it were the effect of good nature, or of a sense of justice, he has been anxious not to prejudice the interests of any other person in the public employment, and has obliged and served great numbers; of course it is not greatly surprising, that he has met with much ingratitude.

Chauvelin, as it has been said, was to be recalled, and Maret was to be appointed to his situation, on the general's departure from London; so that Maret was extremely interested in the success of the negotiation, and had strong motives for smoothing the difficulties that might be in the General's way, and thereby to render his stay at the court of London as short as possible.

C H A P. XIII.

*Departure of de Maulde, of Maret, and of General
Dumourier from Paris.*

IN pursuance of these plans, Emanuel de Maulde, proceeded to the Hague, although the death of the king, which happened while they were in agitation, seemed to be an event entirely destructive of them; for the certainty that Holland was eager to preserve peace induced Garat and Le Brun to believe that all resentment excited by that horrible catastrophe would yield to the great object of preserving peace, and they were not deceived.

Maret's departure was unwisely postponed, (taking place only on the same day that General Dumourier left Paris,) under pretence of first sounding Mr. Pitt, respecting the General's journey to England, by the means of one of his friends, who had already been employed in the same capacity on a former occasion by Maret. But the General had reason to believe that Le Brun, offended that the Court of St. James's would neither treat with him as minister of foreign affairs, nor with the Convention, was not sorry to undermine this negotiation by giving scope to the rash ignorance, of Brissot, and the folly of the diplomatic committee, who seeming to think that France had not enemies

enough

enough to contend with, studied to increase the number, by insulting every nation.

Maret's mission was altogether unsuccessful. Chauvelin had never been acknowledged in England as minister of the Republic, the Court of St. James having considered his mission at an end on the abolition of royalty in France, and having permitted his stay in London merely as an indulgence granted to an individual. And when the news of the cruel death of Louis XVI. arrived in England, Chauvelin was ordered to quit London in four and twenty hours, and the kingdom in eight days. It was under these circumstances that Maret arrived in England, and received an order from the council, instantly to quit the kingdom.

But this ill reception of Maret by the Court of St. James's, did not put a stop to the negociation in Holland. General Dumourier departed from Paris, on the 26th of January, with a mind filled with apprehensions; he had not been able to prevent the commission of an unprovoked, fruitless, disgraceful, and fatal crime; he had not succeeded in procuring a revocation of the decree of the 15th December, nor in obtaining an exception in behalf of Belgium, and thereby to preserve the French army in case of retreat; nor in establishing an effective administration for the supply of arms, subsistence, &c. for the army; nor in his attempts to procure the necessary repairs of the fortified places, reinforcements of the armies, horses for the cavalry, or any of that multitude of objects, the supply of which were necessary to the opening of the campaign; nor (which in every case was the greatest of his afflictions) to save an innocent king, whose goodness was personally known to him. He was about to resume the command of a disorganised army, abandoning itself to robberies, and every

every species of excess, ill armed, in want of cloathing, and dispersed in the impoverished villages along the Meuse, and the Roer. New troops were daily arriving from Germany to augment the army of General Clairfait, who with great capacity had made a stand, and maintained himself between the Herffle and the Roer, with a comparatively small number of troops, in want of every thing, and terrified at the rapidity with which the conquest of Belgium had been accomplished: That general having counteracted all the ill effects of their long retreat.

The Prince of Cobourg, celebrated for his glorious campaign against the Turks, was about to take the command of this army. In the case of Dumourier waiting till the Prince of Cobourg should attack him, he was well assured that he could not resist that General in front, and, at the same time, the Prince of Hohenloe, who would attack him on his right flank by Namur, the citadel of which was then repairing very slowly by the French; and if the English and Dutch should have time to assemble an army on his left flank, on the side of Antwerp and Dutch Flanders, even the retreat of Dumourier would no longer be secure, having to march through fifty leagues of flat country, with a disorderly army, pursued and almost surrounded by three armies more considerable than his own, and continually assailed by the Peasants and the inhabitants of the cities, whom, the excesses committed by order of the Convention, had driven to desperation. General Dumourier, therefore had no other hope of diminishing his perplexities, but the negotiation committed to the care of de Maulde. In truth, his confidence in that was considerable, since Holland had the utmost dread of a rupture with France, being quite unprepared

unprepared for it, and having the greatest interest in the preservation of the neutrality.

We are about to give an account of the further circumstances of this negotiation, which was broken off in the beginning of February, by the unwise and haughty impetuosity of the National Convention. The abrupt declaration of war, made by that Assembly against England and Holland, gave France an air of perfidy, respecting that negotiation, with which the English have reproached them with some appearance of reason; but the same charge may be retorted on the English, and it is probable, that Pitt had no other design than to amuse General Dumourier, to gain time to make the necessary preparatives for war; and the treaty entered into by the court of St. James's with the court of Turin, at that very period, confirms the opinion. So much truth is there in the observation, that history is but a picture of the errors and crimes of governments.

C H A P. XIV.

Fruitless Negotiations. Declaration of War.

IMMEDIATELY on the arrival of de Maulde at the Hague, which was in the latter end of January, he presented General Dumourier's letter to lord Auckland, who testified the greatest pleasure to de Maulde on reading it, and told him that the interests of England and Holland being inseparable in this affair, he should communicate the proposal to Van Spiegle; which was no sooner done, than the latter embraced the project of a conference on the frontiers between the Ambassador of England, the Grand Pensioner, and General Dumourier.

Lord Auckland dispatched three packet boats, immediately succeeding each other, to his court, and de Maulde sent his secretary to Antwerp, where the General had arrived on the 2d of February, after having visited the posts from Dunkirk to Antwerp.

Throughout Picardy, Artois, and maritime Flanders, Dumourier found the people overwhelmed with terror and grief, at the tragical death of Louis the XVI. The very name of Jacobin, he perceived, excited equal fear and horror. In all the cities, however, there were numerous emissaries of the Jacobins, who stirred up the populace against the moderate and wise part of the citizens, and collected accusations, little regarding whether true
or

or false, against the different administrators of the departments.

At St. Omers and Dunkirk, there was not the least appearance of preparations being made for the war, and there were scarcely any troops to be seen, for the minister of war had weakened maritime Flanders, to furnish the augmentation of 10,000 foot and 1500 cavalry, for the army in Austrian Flanders, in consequence of the General's having demanded that reinforcement. The minister of war even drew new battalions afterward from this-country, which was part of the actual seat of the war, to form a body of 12,000 men near Cherbourg, from whence the General had observed a diversion might be made into England, in case war with that power could not be avoided.

Nieuport and Ostend, were in the same condition as St. Omers and Dunkirk, not having a single battery mounted, to prevent any vessels of war entering those ports. There were not even cannon for the purpose; nor could any be obtained, without taking them from Dunkirk, which had not sufficient for its own fortifications.

Dumourier, struck with the disorder which pervaded the whole country, and seeing that his embarrassments every moment encreased, extremely satisfied with the first success of de Maulde's negotiation. He instantly dispatched a courier to Le Brun, with the original answer of Lord Auckland, which stated that the British minister and the grand Pensionary of Holland, had agreed to proceed together to the frontiers to confer with the General; that Lord Auckland had sent several dispatches to his court, to obtain its sanction, and instructions relative to the conference; that he should soon receive an answer, and that his intentions

tions were not to gain time, nor to retard the General's preparations for the campaign.

The dispatches of de Maulde, which accompanied those of Lord Auckland, gave an account of the circumstances of his interview with the British minister, and the grand Pensionary of Holland. Those ministers, as de Maulde was prepared to find, expressed their utter abhorrence of the atrocious barbarity recently committed at Paris ; but as de Maulde gave them positive assurances that the General partook of their sentiments on that subject, and was filled with the profoundest indignation against the authors of the crime, that horrible affair did not retard the negotiation ; and it was settled, without any difficulty, that as soon as Lord Auckland should have received the instructions of his court, the conference should take place at the Moor Dyke, on board a yacht belonging to the Prince of Orange, which would be prepared to receive the General. De Maulde concluded by declaring his persuasion, that the conference would be attended with the greatest success.

The General entertained the same hopes, and had prescribed to himself the plan he thought it his duty to follow. He resolved not to betray the interests of his unhappy country ; on the contrary, it was his intention to diminish the number of her enemies, in settling the neutrality of England and Holland on a sure basis ; but, after he should have rendered this last of his services to France, he resolved to free himself from the imputation of partaking in the crime of his countrymen, and no longer to fight for absurd tyrants whom he was anxious to punish, instead of aiding in the support of their hideous tyranny. He did not design therefore to return to Antwerp but to retire to the Hague, and from thence to publish a memorial in justification of his conduct.

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He unfolded a part of these designs in a letter to de Maulde, which was communicated to the two ministers. They requested leave to take a copy of it, but de Maulde declined granting that permission, being unauthorised by his friend; but at the same time he delivered Lord Auckland a letter from the General, informing that minister that he should receive with great pleasure news of the sanction of the British court to these measures.

At the moment when the negotiation was in this promising state, while the General consoled himself with the hope of being freed from the insupportable yoke of combatting, for tyrants, under the certainty of becoming one day the victim of their ingratitude and cruelty, whatever might be his success; while he thus flattered himself, on the 7th of February he learnt by the public papers that the National Convention had declared war against Holland and England, on a report made by Brissot in the name of the Diplomatic Committee. This news reduced him to despair, for it was altogether unexpected. He had quitted Paris on the 26th of January; had arrived at Antwerp, only on the 2d of February; Le Brun, then, had not waited to receive his first dispatches, nor intelligence respecting de Maulde's negotiation. It seems that Le Brun had precipitated the report of the affront offered to the Republic in the person of Chauvelin, by order of the king of England, to excite the anger of the thoughtless Convention, and thereby raise an insurmountable obstacle to the measures he had concerted with the General.

As to Brissot, he had, as was usual with him, availed himself of this opportunity of insulting both kings and people, in which he was zealously seconded by Barrere and the Jacobins. Thus the
two

two factions united in taking a most disastrous step without discussion and without consideration.

The war was declared, but Le Brun sent no intelligence to General Dumourier, on whom the burthen fell with the greatest weight, and little enquiry was made in the council, whether he was at all in a condition to support himself against these new enemies.

On the day that General Dumourier heard of the declaration of war against England and Holland, de Maulde arrived at Antwerp from the Hague, with a second letter from Lord Auckland, congratulating him on having received an authority from his court to enter on the conference, which was fixed to commence on the 10th, at the Moor Dyke. The General instantly dispatched a courier, informing Lord Auckland of the declaration of war; and observing, that although he must admit the declaration of war to have been a little abrupt, he must observe, it had been occasioned by the conduct of the English ministry; first, in detaining two French vessels laden with corn, notwithstanding the remonstrances of the French ministry to the contrary; secondly, in contemptuously ordering the French Ambassador to quit the kingdom, while a negotiation was pending between the two nations; and thirdly, in causing Lord Auckland to publish, on the 2d of February, an address to the States General, which was an insult to the French nation, and equivalent to a declaration of war.

The General had also causes of complaint against the Grand Pensionary Van Spiegle. He had in vain demanded of him the liberation of Colonel Micoud, a French officer, who, after gaining a considerable law-suit against a merchant in Holland, had been thrown into prison, through the credit of the merchant

chant, an a vague accusation of having spoken too freely of the government. He had driven a troop of French comedians from Amsterdam without even granting them time to collect the sums due to them; he had permitted Noel the French minister at the Hague, and Thainville, his secretary, to be insulted by the emigrants, and had afterwards abruptly ordered them to quit the country; he had allowed the emigrants to appear in military uniforms at the Hague; and finally had suffered the greatest enmity to be expressed against France with impunity.

It is certain that the conduct of the courts of St. James's and the Hague was inexcusable, since in the midst of a negociation entered into (in consequence of overtures from themselves) with General Dumourier, whom they had demanded to conduct the negociation, they had provoked the anger of the National Convention, whom they knew to be haughty and impatient, and incapable of a temperate conduct. It is but just therefore to reproach them as well as the French with the evils resulting from this war, which is to be considered as only in its beginning, and which will be the source of other equally destructive wars.

It may be said, that providence has united all the people of Europe to inflict a punishment on the enormous crimes committed by the French nation; and perhaps to punish their own errors by the calamities they will have to endure in this long, afflicting and bloody contest. The Atheists of the National Convention, and these are the most ignorant and wicked of the members, because it is not through the influence of philosophy that they have become Atheists, but through the influence of their crimes, have considered what the General has said to them respecting Providence in his letter of
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the 12th of March, as an unmeaning rhapsody; to such men he has to answer, that Providence leaves us free to make a virtuous or vicious choice, but that from this first choice necessarily results the character of our actions, good or bad; that that which is just is alone true; that which is unjust is the effect of error in the mind; that this is above all true with respect to governments; and that justice conducts nations to happiness, and injustice to misery; that when a nation is universally infected with a licentious spirit, as is the case with France, all her motives and actions tend to her ruin; hence the same phrenzy which induced France to commit the fruitless crime of murdering Louis XVI. and of treating his family as a herd of slaves, dictated the decree of the 15th of December, which is equally devoid of justice and policy, which has lost the nation the good-will of every people who were attached to her, has infused divisions into her councils, familiarised her with accusations, robberies, and massacres, has begotten her filthiness and grossness of manners; her wantonness in creating of enemies, and indifference to the means of resisting them; and in fine her anarchy and total want of order, which has already inflicted upon her the first punishments of that long series that awaits her. For from the moment that France became a Republic, she degenerated into the most unfortunate country that the annals of the world have produced.

We will conclude this book with a melancholy reflection on the condition to which France has reduced herself by her errors; she had been presented with a constitution formed in a short and difficult period by her first legislature, which was not indeed perfect but highly valuable, and which every people of Europe admired and envied. The two fac-
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tions that existed in France, in combating each other, nevertheless were of one mind to destroy this constitution. The court hoped to recover its former power and numerous means of gratifications, and the Jacobins entirely to beat down royalty, which they hated, but which was so necessary to the happiness of Frenchmen; and while the constitution was a theme of praise with all reasonable men in other parts of Europe, the French blamed, spurned and rejected it. But the merits of the constitution were unknown to the people of France, for they never permitted themselves to judge of it but through the medium of their furious passions.

END OF THE FIRST PART.

MEMOIRS



GENERAL MOUTRIER

WRITTEN BY HIMSELF

AT PARIS IMPRIMERIE DE

PAR 24 IN.

TRANSLATED BY JOHN FENWICK

PART II

DUBLIN

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For P. WOODMAN, P. BRYANT, T. McDONNELL, W. PARKER,
W. JONES, J. MOORE, H. FITZPATRICK, J. MILLER,
AND J. JACKSON, AND G. FOLINGHAM.

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